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PREFACE 
This study explores three variants of climate theory in 
France by Jean Bodin, Montesquieu, and Buffon, the origins 
of which are traceable back to Ancient Greece. It shows 
that arguments about the primacy of climatic influence in 
human affairs were of central importance to each of these 
theorists despite differences in the historical setting 
within which their views were set forth and their overriding 
scholarly and theoretical interests. As we will see, in 
each case the problems these theorists wanted to solve was 
that of human diversity. Climate theory was crucial in 
their attempts to understand both why there were so many 
manifestly different kinds of people and with them, 
differing laws, customs, institutions, physical shapes, 
colors, and size. In addition, climate theory served for 
Bodin to explain the changes that had befallen humans since 
the Fall, for Montesquieu to repudiate Catholic dogma, and 
for Buffon to document the unity of the human species. 
In brief, climate theory means the combination of 
physical factors -- air temperature, winds, geography, 
exposure to the sun, proximity to water, exact location 
to which people are exposed. By an examination of these 
elements these theorists believed that they could account 
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for the distinguishing characteristics that differentiated 
whole groups. It was believed that a careful documentation 
of climate would explain why difference itself existed. 
The tenacity with which theories of climate have 
perpetuated themselves over two millennia of Western 
civilization attests to the powerful appeal such notions had 
for those seeking to explain phenomena that at first were 
startling and perplexing. From the first efforts to 
understand localized disease and explain human variation in 
Greek medicine to contemporary examinations of weather 
patterns and their effects on human development, the idea 
that climate profoundly influenced not just the physical 
circumstances but also the social, psychological, and 
biological makeup of diverse peoples has attracted numerous 
adherents. By examining the work of Bodin, Montesquieu, and 
Buffon this study seeks to explain the attraction, inner 
workings, and multiple applications of climate theory in 
France. 
Jean Bodin -- jurist, historian, and political theorist 
lived in the era of the French Wars of Religion, an epoch 
of profound social, political, and religious upheaval. 
Bodin focused on "universal history" in an effort to throw 
light on the events of his time. Deeply troubled by the 
conflict between Catholic and Protestant he sought to 
explain why diverse laws, customs, and institutions --
especially religious institutions -- had come to exist. He 
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pondered why so many different kinds of people existed when 
all existence owed its origin to God 
the creator, whose powers had first breathed life in human 
beings in the Garden. Since the time of that distant 
paradise much had changed. The Fall inaugurated a ceaseless 
chain of permutations and alterations in human history so 
that by his time the numerous peoples known, and their 
concomitant varieties of laws, customs, and institutions, 
appeared to contradict the Bible's central tenet of common 
human descent. Bodin used his concept of "universal 
history" -- within which his climate theory was embedded 
to explain what had initiated these events and to reconcile 
them with the Biblical account of Genesis. It was within 
this framework of dual necessity -- explaining the 
peculiarities of historical development and the deviations 
that had occurred since the Creation, that Bodin gathered 
and used ideas about climatic influences. Despite the 
essential sameness of all human beings as created by God, 
diversity in both physical form and social life had 
appeared, thanks to the formative role of climate. Bodin's 
ultimate argument was that because climatic influence could 
be only partially mitigated by human efforts, diversity had 
to be recognized and tolerated. This overall historical 
interpretation buttressed the political and social cause 
most important to him -- encouraging tolerance among the 
warring religious factions of sixteenth-century France. 
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Montesquieu lived in an age substantially different 
from that of Bodin. On the surface it appeared that the 
burning issues of Bodin's time had been resolved in favor of 
the French crown and Catholicism. The appearance of calm 
was misleading, however, for forces -- economic, social, and 
political were slowly gathering that would cause deep 
conflicts in the second half of the eighteenth century and 
ultimately help bring revolution to France. Traditional 
precepts of a divinely-inspired social order created and 
perpetuated by the laws of God were submitted to the 
calculating stare of Reason and found wanting. New 
explanations appeared that challenged old canons of thought 
and ushered in an era of intellectual fermentation. 
"Natural Law" gradually supplanted the laws of the exclusive 
Christian God, but it in turn seemed -- as recognition of 
human diversity intensified -- increasingly inadequate to 
explain the maintenance of order in the world of human 
affairs. Diversity was a vexed problem to Montesquieu 
because it seemed to contradict the universal application of 
Natural Law. Thus when attempting to explain the laws of 
nature and those of human societies, Montesquieu appealed to 
climate as one way of making comprehensible the differences 
that existed between humans -- and their various "positive 
laws" -- and still remain faithful to universal Natural Law. 
By turning to climate Montesquieu was able to retain Natural 
Law, explain the diversity immanent in human societies, and 
never waver from the belief that Natural Law was best 
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exemplified in Europe, where political rule, morality, and 
social development best conformed to Natural Law. Thus 
climate theory allowed Montesquieu at one and the same time 
to relative cultural values and norms (for which he has been 
applauded as "the founder of sociology") and to reassert 
over and beyond diversity the superiority of the European 
way of doing things. 
Although Buffon's subject matter -- natural history --
differed from Montesquieu's, he nonetheless shared many of 
Montesquieu's characteristic concerns: the laws of 
development governing societies; the variety of human beings 
throughout the world; and in addition an interest in 
reconciling human diversity with the belief that all humans 
emanated from one source, the white European. Working 
within his system of natural history, Buffon was able to 
create a vast yet deceptively simple explanation that 
resolved the tension that existed between the variety of 
humans and his conviction that Europe epitomized the high 
point of development. His theory of climate fulfilled this 
need by preserving all of these tenets -- unity, variety, 
levels of development -- by postulating that all human 
beings had deviated from the European model because of 
migration, climatic exposure, and the consumption of poor 
foodstuffs. 
The theme which united all three theorists was the need 
to decipher why different kinds of human beings inhabited 
the earth; why they had developed peculiar social practices 
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and customs; and why their institutions differed from those 
most familiar to them. The long tradition of ascribing such 
differences to climate admirably fulfilled their 
requirements. 
I would like to extend my deepest gratitude to the 
faculty members at Oklahoma State University who facilitated 
my graduate studies by responding to my frequent and often 
untimely queries. I extend special thanks to my major 
advisor, Dr. Elizabeth A. Williams, for her.friendship, 
unflagging support, critical readings, and unswerving 
devotion to serious scholarship. Her ability to direct 
students through the of ten labyrinthine corridors of 
graduate study is much appreciated, especially given that I 
was her first test case. Dr. Bryant Tip Ragan deserves 
special consideration for the many favors extended and for 
his enthusiastic love of French history, an enthusiasm that 
has affected me deeply. I would also like to single out 
Dr. Richard c. Rohrs for the help he gave me early in my 
studies, his informed readings of rough drafts, and for his 
devotion to graduate studies. And I must not leave out Dr. 
Paul Bischoff who graciously agreed to become a reader on 
short notice. Finally I would like to express my deepest 
appreciation to Lionel M. Jensen, friend and scholar, whose 
commitment to scholarship, intellectual honesty, and the 
life of the mind will remain with me always. He is an 
example from whom many could profit. 
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In addition I would like to extend my thanks to those 
employees of the Edmon Low Library, especially those who 
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I save for last the person who deserves the most credit 
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without her I would have been unable to enjoy either success 
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CHAPTER I 
THE ETYMOLOGY OF CLIMATE AND ITS 
USE BY THE GREEKS 
The word klima originated in Ancient Greece and was 
first used to denote the slope or inclination of a piece of 
ground. In Greece this restricted definition gradually 
evolved to mean the slope or inclination of either a 
specific or general piece of ground, be it a mountainous 
region, a plain, or a valley. The original definition of 
klima underwent further refinement and expansion in Latin. 
The Latin word climata, too, meant the slope, the rise, or 
the gradient of the earth's surface. Over time the 
definition of climata continued to expand and by the first 
century B. c. Roman astronomers and geographers associated 
climata with the parallels of latitude extending from the 
equator to the poles. This division of the earth into 
climata or zones of latitude was also used to determine the 
length of the longest day in each zone. 
The originally restricted meaning of climata eventually 
took on an expanded definition in Roman astrology and 
geography; it was subsequently associated with the alleged 
or perceived slope or inclination of the earth and the sky 
from the equator to the poles. Thus in ancient geography 
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and astrology climata ultimately came to have three separate 
meanings: first, it could mean any one of the seven 
astrological belts presided over by a planet that divided 
the earth from north to south; second, climata could be any 
of the twenty-four of thirty zones (or belts) of the 
inhabitable earth used to divide it from the equator up to, 
but not including, the poles; lastly, it might mean the 
division of the sky into quadrants based on the cardinal 
points of north, south, east, and west. By the end of the 
first century B.C., the Romans used climata to describe the 
weather of a given locale, which was assumed to depend upon 
the inclination or slope of the earth and the latitude. 1 
Thus by the first century B.C., the original Greek 
sense of klima had changed markedly. No longer was it 
strictly linked with the inclination or slope of the land, 
nor with the latitude of th~ earth, either astrologically or 
geographically; climata, rather, included aspects of all 
these various meanings. Roman use retained its original 
Greek association with slope or incline but included much 
that was originally absent in the Greek definition. By this 
time climata had astrological implications in terms of the 
influence of the planets that guided each of the seven 
zones. It also was used to divide the earth from the 
equator to the poles into thirty distinct zones based on 
computations of half-hour differences. And, finally, it 
could mean the weather in general so long as it was 
affiliated with the occupied zone and the slope or incline 
of that area. 2 
Climate in Greek Medicine 
3 
Ancient Greek medicine was one of the sources of all 
future climate theories because of its concern with the 
relationship between the patient and the physical 
surroundings. A rudimentary outline of what would 
eventually constitute later climate theories is discernible 
in the extant books of the Hippocratic Corpus, especially 
the treatise Airs, Waters, Places. Although Airs, Waters, 
Places contains no systematic theory of "climate," it is 
possible to cull from it the first principles of what would 
eventually become -- in Renaissance and Enlightenment France 
-- general theories of climate. To state that the 
Hippocratic authors developed a general or particular theory 
of climate would be inaccurate; however, it is not an 
exaggeration to state that Hippocrates stressed, 
particularly in Airs, Waters, Places, the effects of 
physical surroundings on human health and well-being. 
More specifically, Hippocrates used ideas about various 
types of airs (or winds), waters, and locations that future 
theorists employed in various combinations to develop their 
climate theories. 
Hippocrates propounded his theory of climate 
dogmatically. His theory forfeited systematic assimilation 
of broad physical surroundings in favor of an empirical 
reductionism that highlighted the particulars of a given 
location in relation to the direction of inhabitants' 
exposure, the direction of the winds, and the types of soil 
and water prevalent. The intent was to recognize the 
relationship between these factors and the prevalence of 
disease. 
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The tone of this particular book, then, concerns itself 
with elucidating the reasons why people's physical 
surroundings favored certain diseases based on the types of 
airs, waters, and places identified by Hippocrates. And it 
was also used to identify the characteristics that 
differentiated whole groups of people. In the first half of 
the treatise Hippocrates enumerated the local external 
factors accounting for the physical and mental capacities of 
entire groups. But in the second half Hippocrates modified 
those ideas by stating that custom too played an essential 
role in shaping people's physical attributes and mental 
capacities. 3 
The first half of Airs, Waters, Places was probably a 
treatise designed to help the peripatetic physician 
familiarize himself with the external factors that helped 
explain the localized coincidence of certain diseases. 4 The 
first thing a physician had to understand, according to 
Hippocrates, was the significance of the local course of the 
seasons. He had to anticipate those changes by being able 
to forecast "the dates of the rising and setting of the 
stars" to recognize the unfolding of the seasons. This 
knowledge was important because of the correlation, in 
Hippocrates' view, between the timing of seasonal changes 
and the diseases most likely to affect a particular town or 
district. 5 The Hippocratic physician also had to study the 
winds, whether warm or cold, the direction from which they 
originated, and the "situation" of the town, that is, the 
direction of its exposure, both for particular sites and 
"those which are common to every country." Winds too 
carried with them variations in the diseases that affected 
people. 6 
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Neither could the physician be ignorant of the water 
supply of a given locale, the soil on which the inhabitants 
depended, and the manner in which a town's inhabitants 
lived. Moreover, there were three types of water that the 
physician had to know: soft, marshy water; water that 
"flows from high and rocky ground"; and salty water 
characterized by a permanent hardness. 7 In addition, the 
wandering physician had to be cognizant of the soil. Was it 
dry? Was it saturated with moisture? Did it produce a 
barren land or did it result in a land "thickly covered with 
vegetation"? Finally, the physician needed to know the type 
of life lived by the inhabitants. Did they eat and drink 
abundantly? Did they fatigue easily? Were they fond of 
physical exertion or work? Or did they maintain a proper 
balance of food and drink in relation to the physical 
elements of their surroundings?8 
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The physician had to be constantly aware of all of 
these physical elements and their constant changes because 
their combination accounted for disease. According to 
Hippocrates, winds dominated every town and district, but 
this dominance stemmed not from the direction of the winds 
but from the direction the town faced. Those towns and 
districts sheltered from the north winds but exposed to the 
prevailing southeast and southwest winds had large 
quantities of "brackish surface water" that were warm in the 
summer and cold in the winter and that caused inhabitants to 
suffer from moist, phlegmatic heads. Their internal organs 
experienced difficulties because the phlegm moved down from 
their heads, adversely affecting their "inner organs." 
Another problem encountered by these people was their 
tendency to have "flabby" physiques, as well as an inability 
to tolerate different types of food and drink. 9 
Towns and districts exposed to the opposite set of 
circumstances, that is, those protected from southerly winds 
but dominated by winds ranging from the northeast to the 
northwest had different health concerns. Their water "is 
cold and hard and usually brackish," and their inhabitants 
exhibited a leanness and sturdiness absent in those 
influenced by southerly winds. Instead of moist 
constitutions, they had dry ones -- tending towards 
constipation -- and they were influenced more by bile than 
by phlegm. 10 
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Places exposed to easterly winds did not experience the 
debilitating effects that influenced those exposed to the 
north or the south. Healthful dispositions were more likely 
to reside in towns and districts protected from the warm and 
cold winds. The water in these areas was always "clean, 
sweet-smelling, soft and pleasant." Hippocrates attributed 
this good fortune to the rays of the early morning sun 
beating down and purifying the "dew from the morning mist." 
Inhabitants of towns and districts exposed to an easterly 
direction had more favorable prospects for good health and 
robust complexions as these areas avoided the perils of 
extreme heat and cold. Their people were likely to be 
endowed with a "better temperament and intelligence" than 
those exposed to northerly or southerly winds as springlike 
conditions dominated there year round. 11 
Areas subject to westerly winds languished under the 
most harmful conditions. The water consumed there, not 
benefitting from the early morning sun, was cloudy instead 
of sparkly and clear. Having the opposite set of external 
factors from those dominating their eastern counterparts, 
these regions were the recipients of autumnal weather year 
round. Towns and districts situated toward the west 
received only the most harmful effects of the sun; 
inhabitants received the full brunt of the sun's rays only 
after it reached its apogee and experienced the sun's hot 
blaze as it set in the afternoort. 12 Because of the town's 
unfortunate position, its inhabitants were susceptible to 
every type of disease. The tremendous differences that 
distinguished the morning from the afternoon in towns and 
districts exposed to the west was most damaging for the 
inhabitants' heal th. 13 
Climate in Asia and Europe 
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The treatise, after deducing the effects of the 
different airs, waters, and places, then proceeded to an 
examination of the differences separating Asians and 
Europeans. According to Hippocrates, not only were Asians 
different from Europeans (Asians were "milder and less 
passionate"), so too were their physical surroundings, 
including plant life ("much bigger and finer in Asia") and 
the land ("tame and docile") . 14 Asia's location to the east 
of Europe accounted, at least in part, for this situation: 
Asia and its people, inhabiting an area closer to the sun 
received its benefits to the fullest. Easterly winds 
prevailed with greater frequency the further east one moved 
thus helping to account for the excellent plant and animal 
life. Because Asia did not experience fluctuations of 
extreme warm and cold winds, the soil provided plentiful 
amounts of food with little or no human exertion. Hard and 
toilsome work, a requirement for procuring adequate food in 
Europe, was unnecessary in Asia . 15 
While Asia, like Europe, was characterized by 
differences in its physical surroundings, in general that 
which was centrally located between the extremes of hot and 
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cold had the greatest fecundity. The central area was 
blessed with the best of everything -- it was neither too 
hot nor too cold, neither too wet nor too dry. Accordingly, 
its inhabitants were of outstanding physique and differed 
little from one another "in size and physical development." 
Although such physical uniformity was good it was offset by 
their mental lethargy. 16 Because Asians were not affected 
by the extremes of warm and cold, they also differed from 
Europeans mentally. Asians were mentally weak and consumed 
by cowardice because the monotony of their springlike 
surroundings provided no mental stimulation, thus their lack 
of mental and physical aggressiveness. They were the 
passive receptors of a bland and repetitious set of external 
factors that induced them to mental and physical lethargy. 
The end result of this lack of extremes -- in terms of 
external stimuli -- led Hippocrates to posit that Asians 
were "not subject to those physical changes and the mental 
stimulation which sharpens tempers and induces recklessness 
and hot-headedness. 1117 By contrast, Europeans were 
constantly affected by an ever changing set of external 
conditions that stimulated and invigorated the mind and 
warded off mental stagnation. 18 
At this juncture, however, just when Hippocrates verged 
on ascribing all differences between Asians and Europeans to 
the determining effects of their physical surroundings, he 
modified his analysis by asserting that the custom of 
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monarchical rule in Asia contributed to the differences 
between them and Europeans. This custom provided an 
additional ingredient that strengthened and reinforced the 
docility and feebleness of Asians. Unlike Europeans, Asians 
lived under a monarchy, and this reinforced the tendency 
toward cowardice already present because of the lack of 
variety in their physical surroundings. Even those born 
with an aggressive disposition (Hippocrates allowed for this 
possibility) eventually succumbed to mental and physical 
docility under a monarchy because this form of rule sapped 
aggressiveness, for "deeds of prowess and valour redound to 
the advantage ... of their masters, while their own reward 
is danger and death." Thus, it was the unending sameness of 
the physical surroundings, combined with the incapacitating 
effect of monarchical rule, that explained the differences 
that separated Europeans from Asians. 19 
After concluding his commentary on the typical 
geography of Asia, Hippocrates proceeded to discuss the few 
parts of Asia subject to violent and extreme changes in the 
physical surroundings. Inevitably, these places had the 
"most varied topography": lands characterized by forests, 
mountains, plains, and meadows. Where the land shifted 
radically so too did the oscillation between warm and cold, 
wet and dry. Places immune from such variation were always 
occupied by people who reflected their unchanging 
situation. 20 
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Differences in physical appearance and mental capacity 
were, according to Hippocrates, assignable to the degree of 
change characteristic of a particular area. The greater the 
variable change in external factors, the greater the 
difference in the physical and mental dispositions of its 
inhabitants. 21 Attempting to explain why the Macrocephali 
had longheads, Hippocrates stated that at first it was 
caused by their custom of wrapping a newborns' head to 
promote its elongation. Such wrapping, however, was no 
longer practiced. What was at first produced by custom had 
thus been made a part of nature: "The chief cause of the 
length of their heads was at first to be found in their 
customs, but nowadays nature collaborates with tradition. 1122 
The shaping of infants' heads by wrapping was no longer 
needed as nature had taken over the custom initiated by the 
Macrocephali. Nature appropriated the customs of the 
Macrocephali and incorporated them in its own work,· thus 
bringing about the temporary fusion of nature and custom. 
The reason for nature's assumption of Macrocephali custom, 
according to Hippocrates, resided in the fact that "the seed 
comes from all parts of the body," what was at first 
artificially produced became naturally a part of the 
Macrocephalis as a result of nature's incorporation of their 
tradition. 23 But the Macrocephalis' longheads gradually 
disappeared because of their intermingling with other 
people. What nature assimilated from custom reversed itself 
because of intercourse with different peoples. Thus, both 
nature and custom were, for Hippocrates, malleable factors 
mutually influencing one other. 
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The Scythians, a nomadic group, were unique because of 
the cold areas they inhabited. They lived on a high grassy 
plain that received neither too much nor too little 
rainfall, which accounted in part for the fact that they 
differed little from one another. Certain of their physical 
features resulted from the physical configuration of their 
lands and the lack of significant change in their physical 
setting. The Scythians lived in the north, below the 
Rhipaean Mountains, and were affected by strong northerly 
winds that seldom gave way to winds from the south. Because 
of this factor, summer visited the Rhipaean Mountains 
rarely, at the most for a few days each year. The remainder 
of the year the Scythians were subject to winter-like 
conditions. No fluctuations between warm and cold existed 
there because of the elevation of the plains and the 
dominance of the northern winds. Because of the unending 
uniformity of their physical surroundings the Scythians, 
like the Asians, were prone to mental sluggishness and were 
noted for their physical similarity. 24 
Upon concluding his analysis of Asians Hippocrates 
discussed the Europeans and why they tended to differ more 
among themselves than did Asians. Europeans differed 
tremendously among themselves "both in size and appearance 
owing to the great and frequent ... changes to which they 
are subject." Warm summer and cold winter winds visited 
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areas of Europe regularly. In addition, much of Europe was 
subject to extremes of drought and rainfall, something 
absent in most of Asia. Because of the wide physical 
variations characteristic of Europe, Hippocrates believed 
that this led to a greater variety in the types of people 
living there. Europe's "nature is different in summer and 
winter, in rainy weather and times of drought," hence "the 
greater variation among individuals of the European races, 
even among the inhabitants of a single city, than is seen 
among Asiatics. 1125 Areas subject to violent changes 
produced people with a fierce and warlike disposition, 
whereas areas noted for the lack of change were known for 
the dullness and docility of the mind and body. 26 
To attribute to Hippocrates a systematic doctrine of 
climate in the first half of Airs, Waters, Places based on a 
broad range of physical factors over a broad geographical 
region would be misleading. Hippocrates believed that two 
towns, one exposed eastwardly and the other to the north, 
and separated by a mere furlong, would be subject to and 
experience different health problems because of their 
contrary positions. The town facing to the east would 
benefit from springlike conditions year round, whereas the 
town exposed to the north would suffer the ill effects of 
winter. 27 Rather, what Hippocrates presented, in the first 
half of the work, was a idiosyncratic rendering of man's 
physical surrounding based on different types of airs, 
waters, and places. This work provided the physician with 
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a handbook that facilitated a quick reading of the dominant 
external factors, allowing him to treat his patients. 
The second half of the book, however, sought to account 
for the different mental and physical constitutions of 
diverse peoples. Hippocrates appealed to the notion that 
the configuration of the land, the types of airs dominant in 
that land, the sameness or diversity of external factors, 
and the customs of the people all played important roles in 
their physical, but especially mental differences. This 
endeavor resulted in a disquisition that ascribed to diverse 
peoples fundamental characteristics that permitted 
Hippocrates to account for their perceived differences1 both 
in their physical setting, mental faculties, and customs 
themes that would long endure and become increasingly 
sophisticated as future theorists sought to account for the 
various kinds of people to which they were exposed. 
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CHAPTER II 
CLIMATE AND HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN 
SIXTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE: 
JEAN BODIN 
Although discussions about climate continued unabated 
from antiquity up to the Renaissance and were used in many 
different contexts and for many different purposes, they did 
not receive systematic application in France until they were 
assembled by Jean Bodin in the sixteenth century. Bodin 
gathered together many common ideas about climate and 
incorporated them into his major publications in his effort 
to understand the movement of history. His theory of 
climate served as a mediating point that brought together 
the three distinct yet connected types of history that he 
recognized: human, natural, and divine. The role of 
climate in natural history was where human free will met 
nature's unalterable qualities. The confrontation pitting 
nature's immutability against human volition resulted in the 
perpetual modification of both; nature erected boundaries 
that were difficult to cross, yet free will continually 
challenged and gradually altered the established boundaries 
of nature. Thus Bodin's focus on climate was fixed within 
his overall view of nature, the role it played in natural 
history, and how it functioned in human history. 
Biographical Sketch of Jean Bodin 
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Jean Bodin, destined to become one of the foremost 
political and historical theorists of sixteenth-century 
France, was probably born in Angers, either in June 1529 or 
1530. The youngest son of Guillaume Bodin, a master-tailor, 
Jean was, like many individuals with his social background, 
committed early in life to train for the priesthood. At a 
young age Bodin gained acceptance into the Carmelita order 
in Angers; after his early training there he moved to the 
Carmelita monastery in Paris where he continued his 
studies. 1 While in Paris Bodin studied philosophy, attained 
fluency in Greek and Latin, and acquired some knowledge of 
Hebrew. 
During the late 1540s Paris was the site of a 
confrontation between proponents of Scholasticism and 
humanist learning. 2 To receive an education in Paris at 
this time almost necessitated exposure to the attack on 
Aristotelian logic initiated by Peter Ramus; indeed some 
evidence suggests that Bodin utilized the Ramist method when 
formulating his most important works. 3 The intellectual 
conflicts that characterized Paris during the middle of the 
sixteenth century probably contributed to Bodin's growing 
disenchantment with abstract, Scholastic logic and 
redirected his attention toward more practical concerns, 
like politics and history, that were beginning to interest 
French humanists. 
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For reasons that are not completely clear, Bodin left 
the Carmelites in the mid-1550s and returned to Angers. 
According to some accounts, there are three possible 
explanations for his departure -- he might have been excused 
because he professed at too early an age; or his superiors 
suspected that he lacked religious orthodoxy; or perhaps the 
stimulus of humanism persuaded him to f oreswear the 
priesthood. 4 There is some evidence to support the 
contention that Bodin experienced a religious crisis during 
the 1550s. His later insistence on religious toleration and 
his belief that religion was a personal matter between the 
individual and God suggest that religious heterodoxy may 
have persuaded him to leave the Carmelites. It appears 
likely that in 1552-53 Bodin visited Geneva, the home of 
Calvinism. If so, he may have witnessed the burning of 
Michael Servetus in 1553. 5 Hence the possibility that 
Bodin's subsequent espousal of religious toleration 
reflected disillusionment with both Catholic and Protestant 
extremism. 
After studying civil law in Toulouse from 1556 to 1559, 
Bodin reappeared in Paris where he began to practice as an 
avocat in 1562. 6 By then all members of the parlements and 
working advocates had to profess publicly the Catholic 
faith; Bodin's name, along with three hundred and sixty-
seven other advocates, is recorded as among those pledging 
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adherence to Catholicism. 7 Shortly thereafter, in 1566, 
Bodin published his first major work, the Methodus ad 
facilem historarium cognitione; this work quickly won Bodin 
acclaim throughout Europe. Nevertheless, in spite of or 
because of his success, renewed suspicion arose over Bodin's 
religious orthodoxy at the time of a royal edict in 1568 
that dismissed royal officeholders of the reformed faith, 
severely punished all Protestants, and required all members 
of the parlements and universities to reiterate their 
allegiance to Catholicism. Speculation concerning Bodin's 
religious heterodoxy culminated in his arrest on March 5, 
1569; he was detained, stripped of his position as 
procureur-qeneral of Poitiers (a position he had held since 
1567), and imprisoned until August 23, 1570. 8 
After his release, Bodin became maitre des reguetes et 
conseiller to Francis, Duke of Alen~on, the king's brother. 
The Duke was the leader of the Politigues, a group that 
promoted religious toleration and freedom of conscience; in 
their opinion the crown need not concern itself with the 
establishment of true religion but, rather, needed to expend 
its energies on the maintenance of social and political 
order. The goals of the Politigues and the Duke's political 
ambitions were thwarted, however, by his ill-conceived 
attempt to wrest the throne from the rightful heir after 
Charles XI's death. 9 
Bodin's association with the Duke made him suspect to 
the newly established crown. Thus Bodin sought to 
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rehabilitate himself and ingratiate himself to the crown by 
publishing Les six livres de la republigue in 1576. 
Although the religious aims of the Politigues had been 
discredited by the Duke's failures, the Republigue adopted a 
tone that accorded fully with their avowed intentions: 
peace instead of civil and religious conflict, social order 
rather than disorder, unity as opposed to factionalism. 10 
After Alen9on's death in 1584 Bodin settled in Laon, 
where in 1587 he assumed the office of procureur du roi, a 
position he inherited on the death of his brother-in-law. 
Even though Bodin had withdrawn from national politics, 
doubts lingered on about his religious views, doubts that 
prompted members of the Catholic League to question his 
orthodoxy. In spite of the League's accusations the 
lieutenant-general of Laon cleared Bodin on the basis of 
testimony given by numerous witnesses that repudiated the 
League's allegations. 11 
Judicial confirmation of Bodin's Catholic orthodoxy did 
not end his problems, for the resurgent strength of the 
Catholic League in the 1580s prompted Henry III to order the 
assassination of the Duke and Cardinal of Guise in 1588. 
This act led to rebellion throughout France; the Parlement 
of Paris order all provincial officials to ignore royal 
orders and to resist the crown. Bodin, as an official of 
the crown in Laon, was placed in the uncomfortable position 
of either publicly declaring for the League or fleeing Laon, 
in all likelihood considerations of personal safety and 
protection of his property led him to announce support for 
the League on March 21, 1589 . 12 
22 
For the next five years Bodin lived an uncertain 
existence. Caught between his desire for social, political, 
and religious harmony and his hostility to the Catholic 
League's religious extremism, Bodin eventually sided with 
Henry of Navarre in 1594. Henry's conversion to Catholicism 
convinced Bodin that he was the only person capable of 
bringing unity to France. Henry's moderate Catholicism now 
seemed to Bodin the only sure means of securing his goals of 
freedom of conscience and tolerant acceptance of religious 
diversity. 13 
The Writing of History in the Renaissance 
Bodin's most important publications were his Methodus 
ad facilem historarium cognitione (1566), Response~ 
paradoxes de M. de Malestroit (1566), and Les six livres de 
la republigue (1576). The one major work that was not 
printed during his life, the Colloquium Heptaplomeres de 
Rerum Sublimium Arcanis Abditis, demonstrated his tolerant 
religious views at a time when such attitudes were 
uncommon. 14 As the Methodus, Republigue, and Heptaplomeres 
demonstrate, Bodin was primarily interested in developing a 
method for the study of universal history; finding the best 
means for evaluating political laws and institutions and 
delineating exactly what type of relationship should exist 
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between the individual and religion. His was an educational 
program incorporating history, politics, and religion. 
Bodin's interests conformed to the humanist belief that 
education, the accumulation and transmission of knowledge, 
was necessary to lead the good life. 15 Humanist pedagogy 
was grounded on the conviction that knowledge -- in Bodin's 
case, historical, political, and religious -- should induce 
people to act according to standards that would increase 
their prospects of attaining the good life. This attitude 
also implied that the acquisition and transmission of 
knowledge had practical benefits leading to the alteration 
or modification of social and political practices. 
The shift in interest from abstract problems to the 
practical concerns of politics and history in sixteenth-
century France owed much to the humanist movement of late 
fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century Italy, where 
recognition of a correlation between politics and history 
resulted not only in study of their relationship but in 
novel methods -- such as a return to the classics -- of 
examining their connections. 16 Abandoning the Schoolmen's 
search for abstract truths, humanists turned to the 
classical authors, whose ethical and political 
pronouncements were more pertinent to everyday life and 
politics. 17 One of the first French humanists to adopt this 
attitude was Guillaume Bude who believed that the study and 
eloquent rendering of the moral and political maxims of the 
classics would improve social and political conditions. 
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Bude's fervent belief in the efficacy of classical study and 
its relevance to current affairs remained one of the 
dominant motifs of sixteenth-century French humanism. 18 
In France humanist preoccupation with history increased 
in the latter half of the sixteenth century. History, 
especially the study of universal history, was thought to 
provide the best means of procuring a moral and political 
education; indeed it was required for a complete 
education. 19 Among those who supported the idea of a 
universal history included Fran~ois Baudouin, Francesco 
Guicciardini, Francesco Patrizzi, and Philippe de 
Cornrnines. 20 Universal history consisted of the study of the 
human past, of nature, and of the role of providence in 
human affairs. Human history was unique because thanks to 
the Fall and the role of human volition it lacked uniform 
and predictable laws of cause and effect. 21 The prudent 
historian had to study how nature, on the one hand, provided 
constants and, on the other, how it helped to fashion and 
influence human physical composition and mental 
dispositions. 22 The history of the divine was the 
culmination of universal history because it brought together 
human and natural history and raised the historian above 
earthly concerns to focus on the Creator. Bodin accepted 
the tenets of universal history and argued that its study 
was intended to clarify the role exerted by natural, human, 
and divine history and the extent of their relationship. 
According to him there were three types of historical 
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knowledge: knowledge of human affairs, the causes and 
effects of nature, and divine matters. An understanding of 
the divine was the ultimate goal of all historical inquiry 
(because it offered the humanist the opportunity to 
contemplate the Creator and to understand universal history 
better) but was obtainable only after illuminating human and 
natural history. 23 
The Tension Between Nature and Humans 
Bodin derived his historical theory from a reading of 
Greek and Roman authorities among whom the most frequently 
cited were Plato, Caesar, Aristotle, Tacitus, Strabo, Livy, 
Plutarch, Posidonius, and Pliny. He also relied heavily on 
Hippocrates, Galen, and Ptolemy to support his theory of 
climate. 24 From these ancient sources Bodin created an 
elaborate and original syn~hesis that attempted to create 
the basis for a catal~guing of universal history. 25 Bodin's 
climate theory was developed to serve this end. 
Specifically his climate theory was intended to identify the 
effects of natural history on human historical development 
and, second, to show how a sovereign could recognize and 
wisely use nature's laws to rule. 26 The relationship 
between natural history and politics, Bodin argued, had been 
neglected; previous disregard of nature's uniformity and 
constancy had led to repeated miscalculation in the 
political realm because no one had recognized that attempts 
to formulate human laws according to absolute standards led 
to the demise of great states. 27 Universal political 
standards were inappropriate precisely because people 
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their laws, customs, and institutions -- differed and were 
subject to change. Those political rulers who mistakenly 
identified their promulgations with fixed natural laws did 
not realize that human variety existed in nature. One way 
to understand both the constancy of nature and the variety 
of humans better -- their different laws, customs, and 
institutions -- was to examine their climate, especially 
latitude, topography, and exact location. 28 Through God's 
creative act, nature's fixed and immutable order was 
assured, yet the types of people and climate differed 
widely. 29 Only after evaluating the influence of climate on 
the physical and mental disposition of people, and by 
extension, its effect on their laws and institutions, could 
the wise ruler "consider what efficacy lies in training to 
alter the nature of men. 1130 
Though "nature" meaning climatic factors -- exerted 
a profound influence on human beings, it could be 
transformed, though only "by great force or long 
training. "31 Bodin did not teach that human beings were 
powerless before nature. Its influence was "incomplete" 
because the soul was "free from all materiality." However, 
proximity of the soul to the mind, and, in turn, of the mind 
to the spirit, the spirit to the blood, and the blood to the 
body led nature to impress upon the soul an indelible 
mark. 32 Human volition was conditioned by yet free from 
complete subjection to nature because God had granted free 
exercise of the will. 
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Despite the human capacity to alter nature, nature's 
powers remained undiminished and with time "eventually they 
(nature's elements] return to their pristine character. 1133 
Education and training (both that which was "divine(ly]" 
inspired through God's direct intervention, and that which 
resulted from "human" activity) could free people from 
complete dependence on nature provided that they vigilantly 
safeguarded their "laws and customs"; otherwise ·"the people 
will soon return to their natural disposition. "34 The 
Germans had demonstrated the human ability to escape 
nature's confines; once they were barbaric and savage, 
wholly subject to nature, but through their leaders' 
constant efforts they had been "carried along the path of 
civilization. "35 
Bodin's Theory of Climate 
Bodin adhered to the Ptolemaic conception of the seven 
heavenly spheres; first the moon, then Mercury, Venus, the 
Sun, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, and the eighth sphere of the 
stars. In addition Bodin added two other spheres to account 
for the movement of the celestial bodies and the daily 
revolution of the first seven spheres. The ninth sphere 
explained the west to east movement of the celestial bodies 
and the daily revolution of the first seven spheres, 
while the tenth accomplished the same task for the daily 
movement of the stars from east to west. 36 
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Bodin's cosmology emphasized the influence of the 
heavens on the physical composition of all earthly things, 
though he rejected Galen's argument that human physical 
composition -- consisting of the four elements and governed 
by celestial bodies -- absolutely determined moral behavior. 
"Celestial bodies" did not "exercise ultimate control" over 
human affairs; there was no direct correlation between the 
individual and the cosmos. 37 In spite of this 
qualification, Bodin believed that the planets presided over 
the hot, cold, and temperate zones of the earth, regulating 
and directing human dispositions, mental tendencies, and 
actions. He assigned to each climate zone one of the 
outermost and innermost planets. 38 Southerners were guided 
by Saturn, Venus, and the sun; northerners by Mars, the 
moon, and the sun; the middle region by Jupiter, Mercury, 
and the sun. Saturn promoted understanding, Mars warlike 
behavior, Jupiter reason and just behavior. This allotment 
allowed Bodin to "understand more clearly the precise power 
of nature" because the assignment of planets to each zone 
clarified differences of human behavior. 39 Despite Bodin's 
allocation of the planets to the zones, he rejected the 
excessive determinism "of Ptolemy and the ancients" who 
believed that "the customs of peoples could be traced to the 
parts of the zodiac they apportioned to each. 1140 
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Bodin accepted the ancient doctrine of the four 
elements of the universe: earth, air, fire, and water. 41 
All living things were composed of the four elements but 
only one dominated, depending upon the latitude, 
configuration of the land, exact location, and longitude. 
Latitude was the most important because of the influences of 
the sun and the other heavenly bodies. Neither the sun's 
light, nor that of the heavenly spheres, fell uniformly on 
the earth's surface. Thus the heat of the sun and the 
"virtues" of the heavenly bodies were unevenly distributed. 
Because the earth occupied a fixed location, the daily 
revolution of heavenly bodies, as well as their different 
positions in relation to the earth over an extended period, 
accounted for the infinite variety of living things. 42 The 
heavens thus contributed to the emergence of one dominant 
element in each latitude. Land configuration was next in 
importance because it determined whether one lived in 
valleys, the mountains, the plains, or in hilly areas. 43 
Exact location within specific areas helped to explain the 
dominant element because it reflected influence from the 
north, south, east, or west. 44 Lastly, longitude -- the 
difference between east and west -- was negligible compared 
to the other factors contributing to the formation of the 
dominant element because neither really existed. 45 
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Bodin's Climatic Zones and the Variety of Peoples 
In explicating his climatic theory Bodin argued for the 
importance of examining "the nature of the people" residing 
in the north, south, east, and west before investigating 
"the characteristics of special places," such as "mountains, 
marshes, windy and placid regions." Interested in the 
general characteristics of groups rather than in 
individuals, he thought it more important to delineate the 
tendencies of people based on the four cardinal points 
because they reflected the more general tendencies of people 
in special places. 46 Bodin divided the earth from the 
equator northward into three thirty-degree zones. The first 
zone, occupied by southerners, he labelled "the burning 
Regions." The temperate zone followed, inhabited by people 
subject neither to extreme heat or cold. The cold zone 
extended from sixty-degree latitude to the poles, "regions 
that [were) exceedingly cold. 1147 The mental and physical 
peculiarities of humans corresponded to these thirty-degree 
zones: a phlegmatic, watery constitution was dominant in 
the north and a dry, melancholic one in the south. In the 
temperate zone people fell into two groups: those in the 
northern half were sanguine and choleric, while in the 
southern half they were sanguine and melancholic. 48 
The distribution of people conformed to the latitudinal 
divisions of hot, temperate, and cold. Bodin offered as 
evidence the skin color of people living in the three zones: 
under the tropics they are unusually black; 
under the pole, for the opposite reason, 
they are tawny in color. After that, down 
to the sixtieth parallel, they become ruddy; 
thence to the forty-fifth parallel they are 
white; after that to the thirtieth they 
become yellow, and when the yellow bile is 
mixed with the black, they grow greenish 
until they become swarthy and deeply black 
under the tropics . 49 
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The analogy Bodin drew between the three principal zones and 
skin color held also for internal composition. The further 
north one moved the more internal heat the body retained; 
heat coalesced, providing protection against external cold 
and explaining the great size and vitality of northerners 
compared to southerners. Exactly the opposite situation 
existed in the south, there the body naturally lost heat and 
became increasingly cold, making southerners smaller and 
less energetic. 50 Whereas all the people of the north and 
south were dominated by one principle (either heat or cold), 
people in the temperate regions "had an infinite variety 
blended from the extremes" and thus escaped the enervating 
aspects of both. 51 The excessive elements predominant in 
northerners and southerners cancelled each other out and the 
best possible balance emerged. 
Bodin developed a similar analogy to explain the 
distribution of metals in the earth. In the north iron lay 
near the earth's surface, while in the south gold was "found 
in the fields and clean sands," 
As the other metals are melted by the 
strength of the fire in the north ... 
so in the south gold is collected, not 
by the heat of the fire, but by the 
force of the celestial stars and the 
heat of the sun." 
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The celestial forces that created in southerners a cold, dry 
interior, and in northerners a warm, moist one similarly 
affected the earth's composition. Thus in Bodin's climate 
theory the mineral composition of the earth and that of its 
inhabitants reflected one another. 
In spite of Bodin's espousal of causal connections 
linking celestial bodies, the earth and its composition, and 
the character of its inhabitants, he refused to consider 
these relationships as deterministic, principally because 
Christian doctrine did not permit exact relationships of 
cause and effect that denied free will and God's ability to 
intervene directly in earthly affairs. Thus the connections 
he described merely allowed one to elucidate general 
tendencies -- not universal maxims -- because they "do not 
have fixed control. 1153 
People in the southern region received from God the 
"force of genius" that permitted them to achieve excellence 
in "letters, useful arts, virtues, training, philosophy, 
religion, and lastly humanitatis itself. "54 Southerners 
naturally contemplated and meditated on the most sublime 
truths; the result was an intelligence that focused on 
religion, nature, and divine matters. Their eyes focused on 
the starry heavens, southerners were the propagators of 
wisdom that purified the mind. Hence it was they who had 
discovered and spread all the truly great religions and 
"revealed the secrets of nature" as well as those of the 
"celestial bodies."" 
Inhabitants of the northern zone were not privy to 
revealed truths but were compensated for their lack of 
philosophical insight with brute strength. All of their 
great successes were "accomplished ... by force of arms, 
like slaves and in the way of wild beasts. 1156 Blessed with 
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keen senses -- and thus animal-like -- northerners excelled 
in the manual arts and everything that required "skill and 
strength." They discovered, by means of their acute senses, 
"those objects called 'mechanical' -- engines of war, the 
art of founding, printing, and whatever else belongs to the 
working of metals. 1157 
Whereas people of the south discovered universal truths 
and northerners the manual arts, those in the temperate zone 
were best suited for managing human affairs; from that 
region there first emerged "institutions, laws, and 
customs," later "the best method of directing the state," 
and lastly "commerce, government, rhetoric, dialectic, and 
finally the training of a general. "58 All of the great 
empires -- "Asia, Greece, Assyria, Italy, Gaul, and Upper 
Germany" -- lay in the temperate zone thanks to a balanced 
disposition that permitted reason to create the best means 
for managing human affairs. 
The people therefore of the middle regions 
have more force than they of the South, & 
less policy: and more wit than they of the 
North, & less force; and are more fit to 
command and govern Commonweales, and more 
just in their actions.~ 
34 
The ability of people in the temperate zone to exploit their 
superiority in arms over southerners and their intelligence 
over northerners explained historical development and more 
recent events. The French crown never defeated the Anglo-
Saxons militarily just as the Anglo-Saxons were incapable of 
conquering the Scots. Never-theless, the French employed 
superior skill to mitigate their military losses when 
negotiating with the Anglo-Saxons; the same circumstances, 
with the same results, characterized relations between the 
Scots and the Anglo-Saxons. 60 
Bodin related the division of the three principal zones 
and the mental and physical types of their respective 
peoples" to the threefold universe": 
that is, the intellectual, consisting of 
the minds; the celestial, the stars; the 
elemental, where the origin and destruction 
of things occur. Here, in turn, belongs a 
threefold order of souls .... The first 
seems to turn purified intellects to God; 
the second to direct states; the last is 
occupied with matter and form. 61 
Thus the three groups reflected "the triple activities of 
the soul," which were "wisdom, prudence, and creative 
ability." And the triple activities of the soul dwelt in 
"con temp la ti on, action, and production. 1162 In turn, 
contemplation, action, and production matched the three 
stages of life: old age, maturity, and youth. The warmth 
and wetness of northerners denoted youth; the proper mixture 
of the four humors the maturity of people in the temperate 
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zone; while southerners resembled "old men" because they 
were cold and dry like the aged. 63 Ultimately all these 
factors -- the planets, latitude and longitude, the 
distribution of metals and elements, the disposition of the 
soul and the stages of life -- were intermixed in a complex 
pattern of analogies that explained variety in both mental 
and physical traits and in historical development. 
Conclusion 
As a part of natural history climate was important 
because it allowed the historian to understand more 
completely nature's role in shaping and conditioning human 
surroundings. More important, it was necessary to 
understand how climate operated because of its enormous 
effect on history. Climate was a part of both human and 
divine history: divine in that nature was the work of the 
Creator and human because it was the stage upon which the 
human drama unfolded. The intimate connections Bodin made 
between the three types of knowledge, and the similar links 
he drew between climate, human history, and the dependence 
of both on the Creator, indicates that his theory of climate 
was relevant to all three types of history. It was most 
relevant to human history because its study could uncover 
patterns of intellect, behavior, and physical composition 
that human beings could only slightly alter. Its relevance 
to natural history was also clear because it made more 
understandable both nature's uniformity and diversity. 
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Finally it was relevant to divine history because the 
comprehension of climate led one to marvel at the ingenuity 
of the Creator. 
Bodin's importance as a theorist of climate and his 
influence was immense; he brought together many ideas 
commonly held by men of learning but applied them with 
originality, explaining why religions arose in the south, 
why the north was the source of the "mechanical arts," and 
why the middle region produced strong government. Further 
he was the principal Renaissance historian to formulate the 
problem of how climate influenced, and could in turn be 
influenced by, human beings. In showing how natural and 
human history engaged in a process of perpetual modif ica-
tion -- nature having boundaries that were difficult to 
cross yet free will continually challenging and gradually 
altering those boundaries -- Bodin struck a delicate balance 
between determinism and the human capacity to act on nature. 
Bodin's work represented an ambitious enterprise that 
was to be taken up by later theorists and used to explain 
everything from the differences between the ancients and the 
moderns to the emergence and location of genius to the most 
ambitious effort of all, Montesquieu's attempt to understand 
the operation of political laws in light of the influence of 
climate. 
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CHAPTER III 
CLIMATE AND LAW IN MONTESQUIEU'S 
L'ESPRIT DES LOIS 
Ce qui f ait la plupart des contradictions 
de l'homme, c'est que la raison physique 
et la raison morale ne sent presque jamais 
d'accord. 
Pen see 
Charles Louis Joseph de Secondat, the future Baron de 
Montesquieu, was born in 1689, at a time when the faint 
murmurs of impending change slowly became audible in Europe. 
The precarious balance so painstakingly established in 
seventeenth-century Europe began to lurch: the reliance on 
traditional perceptions of the world -- the priority of 
God's laws, the divinely-ordered social hierarchy, the 
assurance of European supremacy -- began to crumble. The 
gradual undermining of these old verities was caused by 
diverse political and intellectual developments: the 
Glorious Revolution in England (1688-89); the 
epistemological revolution initiated by John Locke; the 
continued conflict between Catholicism and Protestantism; 
and, most importantly, for our purposes, the exploration of 
continents beyond Europe. 1 
42 
,At first the explora:t.ion of new lands had aroused only 
scattered comments. Initial reports of strange and exotic 
people elicited little response beyond recognition of 
their "novelty"; they were nothing more than an intoxi-
cating diversion that did not profoundly alter European 
conceptions about the order of the world. Eventually, 
though, exploration stimulated and createp the conditions 
necessary to challenge pretensions of Europe as a privileged 
sanctuary on earth. Contact with different societies 
engendered discussion and debate on the merits of European 
society itself. Those who themselves were chroniclers and 
explorers, as well as those who learned about distant lands 
from their accounts, began to reassess old beliefs, 
assumptions, attitudes, customs, and prejudices. 2 
"Freethinkers" used the reports of chroniclers and 
discoverers to question the supposed European monopoly on 
truth, morality, and God's word. These freethinkers set .out 
to demonstrate that Europe did not possess exclusive rights 
to truth; from their efforts issued a growing recognition 
that more than one standard existed by which to assess the 
value of European and other societies. The effort to 
explain the incongruities encountered in exploration 
provided Europeans with the opportunity to reexamine the 
sureties that informed European thought. 3 
Nevertheless, powerful ideas remained and gradually 
surf aced to check the attraction of these societies and to 
reinforce the idea of European preeminence. 4 One such idea 
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was climate. It was used to classify and judge other 
peoples and to demonstrate European superiority on 
"objective" grounds. Not only could it explain the 
differences within Europe but it could serve, in the hands 
of someone like Montesquieu, to explain the diversity of 
peoples, to classify and demonstrate how the temperate 
climate of Europe had facilitated European primacy. A 
longstanding belief in the power of climate was utilized by 
Montesquieu as a way of categorizing various people into 
divisions that privileged Europe and allowed for the 
labelling of remote peoples along lines familiar to 
Europeans. 
Montesquieu's Intellectual Development 
Montesquieu's published works began to appear shortly 
after the death of Louis XIV in 1715 when French 
intellectual life began to undergo rejuvenation. An 
interest in natural philosophy, art, literature, and history 
once again revived. 5 Concurrent with the renewed concern 
with these interests was an organizational reorientation of 
intellectual life both formally in science and informally 
with the creation of clubs and salons -- that would 
profoundly affect later developments in France. The 
establishment of new scientific institutions in the middle 
of the seventeenth century gained momentum with the formal 
reorganization of the Paris Academy of Sciences (1699) and 
the founding of provincial academies at the end of the 
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seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth centuries. 6 
Other organizational forms also emerged -- the salon and 
club -- that, while informal and lacking state support, 
nevertheless were of immense importance in providing a forum 
for the dissemination of new ideas. 
Members of these new clubs and salons circulated an 
increasing number of clandestine manuscripts at gatherings 
where the origins and ambiguities of Roman and canon law, 
entrenched social customs, royal decrees, and the efforts of 
the parlements to limit Royal authority were discussed. 7 
Two prominent examples of this activity were the club de 
l'Entresol and the salon of Madame de Lambert. 8 At the 
weekly gatherings of the club de l'Entresol, members read 
foreign newspapers, discussed manuscripts, and presented and 
criticized papers on politics and history. 9 While he may 
have read a paper to the club, Montesquieu was more visible 
in the small group that met at Madame de Lambert's, where 
history and politics also received considerable attention. 
Two frequent visitors to the salon were Bernard le Bovier de 
Fontenelle (perpetual secretary of the Paris Academy of 
Sciences) and Jean-Baptist Dubos (literary and art 
theorist). 
Both Fontenelle and Dubos had considered climate and 
its effect on people. 10 In his Digression .2..!:ll:. les anciens 
et les modernes (1688), Fontenelle discussed how climate 
influenced religion, health, and history; he believed that 
climate had originally dominated but had gradually 
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diminished in significance as social relations among people 
assumed greater importance. 11 The abbe Dubos used similar 
ideas for a different purpose. In his Reflexions critiques 
~la poesie et~ la peinture (1719), he addressed the 
issue of what "genius" was and how it operated. Dubos 
defined genius as an attribute received at birth that was 
perfected only after the long study and imitation of nature. 
He identified climate as one factor that either hindered or 
facilitated the emergence of genius in art and poetry. 12 
According to Dubos, climate affected the growth of genius 
more than it did physical attributes because of its 
importance in shaping the manners, moeurs, and actions of a 
society. 13 Hence climate could lead either to virtuous 
behavior (productive of genius) or to vice (vice productive 
of depravity) . 14 
Perhaps Montesquieu's acquaintance with Fontenelle and 
Dubos made him aware of the argument that climate somehow 
influenced physical and mental development or both before he 
himself studied climate seriously. Nonetheless, there is 
little evidence to support the contention that he considered 
climate and its implications in any systematic way until he 
visited Italy in 1728-29 . 15 
Aside from the writings of Fontenelle and Dubos, other 
sources known to Montesquieu commented directly or 
indirectly on climate. Travel literature and travellers 
returning from Italy mentioned the wretched air of Rome and 
its surrounding countryside; indeed, its ill-effects on 
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heal th were common knowledge. 16 Perhaps one of 
Montesquieu's most important sources was the little known 
theorist Espiard de La Borde. In 1743 La Borde had 
published in Brussels his Essais .fil!.f: le genie et le 
caractere des nations; it reappeared in 1752 as L'esprit des 
nations and was translated into English the following year. 
In this work La Borde used climate in two ways, sometimes 
defining it traditionally -- distinguishing between the 
different climates based on half-hour differences of the 
longest day between parallels of latitude -- and in other 
instances using the word to mean air temperature or, more 
generally, the weather. Montesquieu probably had access to 
La Borde's work and quite possibly used it; one of the few 
surviving copies of Espiard's Essais is in the Bordeaux 
library frequented by Montesquieu. Thus arises the 
possibility that Montesquieu appropriated La Borde's 
neologism, climat, a word that until 1762 retained its 
official definition as a geographically determined parallel 
of latitude. 17 
Montesquieu also knew essays written by the English 
physician John Arbuthnot, who in 1731 published a medical 
treatise entitled An Essay Concerning the Effects of Air on 
Human Bodies (translated into French in 1742). In addition, 
Montesquieu's library at La Brede included a copy of 
Hippocrates' De Aere, two copies of Bodin's Republigue, and 
one copy of Bodin's Methodus. 18 Other sources consisted of 
Les recits de voyages, especially that of Le Chevalier 
Chardin . 19 
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Thus a rich heritage of ideas about climate and its 
effects on the moeurs and social conventions of people 
circulated among the educated in France. Although 
Montesquieu's predecessors and contemporaries used theories 
of climate as he did -- to discern why there were so many 
varied societies -- significant contrasts set him apart from 
his peers. Their studies emphasized the relationship 
between social activity and the different climates, whereas 
Montesquieu emphasized climate's influence on societal 
morals. 20 
Montesquieu's tremendous success stemmed from a 
confluence of circumstances. The scope of his efforts, the 
eloquence of his work, and his social position vaulted him 
into the ranks of the most respected savants and solidified 
his standing within the emerging group of thinkers concerned 
with politics and history. He became the foremost political 
theorist of mid-eighteenth-century France and his work was 
invested with almost unparalleled authority. 
Relations Between the Physical and the Moral 
Montesquieu's first attempt to explore the relationship 
between the physical and the moral came in the mid-1730s 
with his Essai sur les causes qui peuvent affecter les 
esprits et les caracteres. 21 Montesquieu first discussed 
material causes: air, wind direction, location, and 
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nourishment. Exposure to these elements in different 
combinations formed people's physical and mental traits. 
Montesquieu's most important work, L'esprit des lois (1748), 
incorporated elements of his earlier analysis but was more 
discriminating and less dogmatic. As the title indicates he 
was interested in the functioning of laws and how they 
operated in societies, providing them the means by which to 
perpetuate themselves. 
Montesquieu defined "invariable laws" as "the necessary 
relations deriving from the nature of things," the binding 
relationship of cause and effect that governed phenomena as 
defined by natural philosophers. 22 He believed that these 
necessary relations existed not only in the physical world 
but also in the connection of the physical to the moral. 
Yet the link between them was not as strictly determined nor 
as enduring as were the physical laws of natural 
philosophy. 23 
Even though "man, as a physical being" was subject to 
physical laws, he possessed the ability, unique in nature, 
to make positive laws without necessarily having recourse to 
nature's laws. The product of "human reason," positive laws 
assumed different forms according to the circumstances of 
each nation. Accordingly, "the political and civil laws of 
each nation ought to be only the particular cases in which 
this human reason is applied. "24 But because physical and 
positive laws jointly governed in human beings the tension 
between them made it difficult to judge where the physical 
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ended and the moral commenced. Thus reason's operation 
differed for each nation and so too did their positive laws. 
As people were limited in intelligence and possessed 
free will, they were "subject to ignorance and error." 
Because of this "man" continually encroached upon the laws 
of nature as well as "chang(ing] those that he establishes 
himself. 1125 This explained why reason -- as manifested in 
positive laws -- depended upon attributes unique to the 
physical surroundings of people. Positive laws had to be 
evaluated 
relatives au physigue du pays; au climat glace, 
brfilant au tempere; a la qualite du terrain, a 
sa situation, a sa grandeur; au genre de vie des 
peuples ... elles doivent se rapporter au degre 
de liberte que la constitution peut souffrir; a 
la religion des habitants, a leurs inclinations, 
a leurs richesses, a leurs commerce, a leurs 
moeurs, a leurs manieres . 26 
Climate, soil, location, and land configuration were the 
physical factors that related most directly to the positive 
laws of each country. Their combination determined which 
kinds of positive laws existed and the extent to which they 
were dependent on or opposed to physical laws. They 
explained not only why countries were governed differently 
but also why there were several levels of political and 
social development. Some countries, unable to distance 
themselves from physical laws, were backward, while others, 
having earlier wrested themselves from physical dependence 
and relying almost exclusively on positive laws, were more 
advanced. 27 Although reason was universal, its applications 
remained irregular. Thus, some countries were superior 
because they operated almost completely according to 
positive laws; countries where positive laws depended 
heavily on physical ones were less advanced; and countries 
where positive laws did not exist or were only tenuously 
established leaned heavily on physical ones. 
The Definition of Climates and Their Formation 
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Although Montesquieu retained much of the traditional 
theory of three climatic zones as developed by Bodin, he 
offered a new definition of climate. Broadly defined, 
climate meant air temperature and, by extension, the effects 
it had on the body. Secondary elements of climate included 
soil, location, and extent of the land. Land configuration 
was a necessary element that contributed to climate's 
overall influence. The greater part of north Asia and 
Europe served as examples. Asia, according to Montesquieu, 
was divided by a chain of mountains that separated Siberia 
from Grand Tartary; north of the mountains the bitter cold 
air made cultivation of the land impossible. 28 The cold 
resulted from two causes: the elevation of the land and the 
pattern created when the mountains running from north to 
south were "levelled in such a way that the north wind blows 
everywhere without finding obstacles. "29 In contrast, 
Europe benefited from the shelter supplied by mountains 
extending from Norway to Lapland that formed "admirable 
bulwarks which cover the northern countries from this 
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(same?] wind." This barrier made it possible, as far north 
as Stockholm, to grow fruits and vegetables. 30 In Asia, 
however, the mountains and land elevation made countries 
that occupied the same latitude as southern France "as cold 
as Iceland. 1131 Thus Montesquieu concluded that Asia "did 
not properly have a temperate zone." The lack of a 
temperate zone meant that cold and warm climates were 
contiguous which led to flaws in the social and political 
institutions of Asia. A common climate led to the adoption 
of similar kinds of social conventions and political 
institutions, such as despotism, slavery, and polygamy 
all of which were antagonistic to the growth of good 
government and strong moral convictions. 32 
The situation in Europe was quite different. Its 
temperate zone was "very extensive." Regardless of the 
differences of climate in Spain and Italy, Norway and Sweden 
comme le climat y devient insensiblement 
froid en allant du midi au nord, a peu 
pres a proportion de la latitude de chaque 
pays, il y arrive que chaque pays est a 
peu pres semblable a celui qui en est 
voisin; qu'il n'y a pas une difference; 
et que, comme je viens de le dire la 
zone temperee y est tres etendue . 13 
There was an incremental shift of temperature northward that 
was virtually imperceptible; thus "strong nations are 
opposed to strong; those which touch have approximately the 
same courage." But the contrast of warm and cold climates 
in Asia led unavoidably to northern subjugation of the 
south, "therefore it is necessary that the one is conquered 
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and the other the conqueror. 1134 In Europe an equilibrium 
had emerged that impeded the domination of any one country 
by another. Parity reigned. But in Asia the severe 
contrast of climate rendered warm countries prone to 
northern control. 35 Thus climate and geography facilitated 
the establishment of despotic empires in Asia and precluded 
them in Europe. It was apparent to Montesquieu that 
Europe's climate and geography nurtured a love of liberty 
while that in Asia fostered slavery and its political 
handmaiden, despotism. 
The Climate and the Soil 
The fertility or barrenness of the soil was also 
important in determining the extent of freedom or servitude. 
Productive lands "naturally establish[ed] dependence" 
because farmers were too concerned with cultivation to worry 
about or be "jealous of their liberty. 1136 As unfavorable as 
barren soil or mountainous regions might initially appear, 
they stimulated liberty and independence among their 
residents who strive to "preserve what they have ... 
[because] they have little to preserve." In other words, 
these regions actually favored liberty because nothing else 
remained. 37 By zealously protecting their liberties these 
countries were governed republics (controlled either by all 
the citizens or only by the aristocrats) rather than 
despots. 38 
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Inhabitants of desolate lands were diligent workers, 
oblivious to hard labor; they procured through constant 
effort what the land refused to tender. Their want provided 
the incentive lacking in lands blessed with abundance, where 
the fertile soil "gives, with ease weakness, and a certain 
love for the preservation of life. 1139 The spirit of 
servility infecting fertile lands meant that "the spirit of 
liberty could not return" once the land's bounty accustomed 
people to laziness. 40 In addition, lands copiously blessed 
were subject to constant threats of invasion and plunder, 
another factor that contributed to the acceptance of 
servitude. Sterile soil, however, was not coveted and 
allowed farmers to spend the time necessary to make it 
productive. 41 
The Physical Effects of Climate 
Montesquieu maintained the traditional postulate that 
climate affected the body's ability to respond to external 
stimulation and that this translated into definite mental 
attributes for given groups. 42 Following Arbuthnot, as well 
as his own experiments on the effects of air, he concluded 
that air temperature directly influenced the ability to 
receive and respond to outside stimuli by either expanding 
or contracting the "exterior fibers" and "nerve bundles" of 
the skin, thus increasing or decreasing the dispatch with 
which people responded to external sensation. 43 
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Montesquieu undertook experiments on a sheep's tongue 
to determine how the body reacued to air temperature. After 
having the tongue frozen, he discovered that its appearance 
differed markedly from beforehand, when frozen "the mamilla 
[down-like hair] is considerably diminished," some of it had 
even "sunk into their sheath. "44 He believed that this test 
validated his thesis that "in the cold countries the nerve 
bundles are less expanded." Their contraction in cold 
climates made people less susceptible to "the action of 
exterior objects. 1145 Combining conclusions drawn from this 
experiment with some personal observations of how people in 
Italy and England reacted to the same opera, Montesquieu 
stated that: 
J'ai vu les operas d'Angleterre et d'Italie; 
ce sont le memes pieces et les memes acteurs: 
mais la meme musique produit des effets si 
differents sur les deux nations, l'une est si 
clame [sic], et l'autre si transportee, que 
cela parai t inconcevable. 46 
The cold English climate contracted the external fibers of 
the skin and the nerve bundles, a physiological pattern that 
prevented the music from stimulating their "sensibility" as 
it did in Italy, where receptiveness to outside stimuli was 
greater. 
While cold air "constrict[ed] the extremities of the 
external fibers," it increased their "elasticity" and forced 
more blood toward the heart. 47 Thus people in cold climates 
were less aware, less cognizant of their surroundings 
because contraction of their fibers led to diminished 
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sensations. 48 So barren were northerners of sensation that 
in Russia "it (was) necessary to flay a Muscovite in order 
to give him sentiment. "49 . Al though decreasing people's 
physical responses, cold climates translated into positive 
mental attributes. As cold air augmented physical strength, 
people had "more confidence in themselves," were more candid 
and courageous, less likely to seek revenge, and devoid of 
suspicion. 50 Individuality and freedom were fostered; 
servitude discouraged. 51 
Warm air occasioned the opposite physical and mental 
circumstances. "Hot air" reiaxed the skin and lessened 
blood flow so that "the end of the nerves ... (are] expanded 
and exposed to the smallest action" of external agents. 52 
Montesquieu concluded that people in warm climates responded 
to the slightest promptings, which rendered them incapable 
of aggressive behavior. He argued, for example, that if a 
man was enclosed in a warm area for an extended period he 
would be reluctant to consider any bold action: "he will 
fear everything because he will feel that he can do 
nothing. 1153 The heat of India provided a perfect example 
because it illustrated how a warm climate "enervated and 
·Overwhelmed" the body 
there "movement (was] 
it made rest seem natural -- for 
arduous." 
India's torrid. climate spawned a "systeme de 
metaphysique" founded solely on the ill-effects of heat. 
This metaphysical system materialized because of the 
"laziness of the climate," which had caused the Buddha to 
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"put man in an extremely passive state. 1154 In India the 
populace was accustomed to "the worst effects of the 
climate," which hindered the creation of beneficial positive 
laws. The idle resignation typical of Indians resulted from 
poor positive laws caused in turn by the poor climate. 55 
Indians' acquiescence to the climate was but an example of 
how a warm climate could lead people to accept a pattern of 
thought and action wholly dependent upon physical causes. 
The warmth of India's climate demonstrated not only that 
Indians had progressed less than other Asians but also that 
it hampered attempts to alter Indian moeurs and social 
institutions. 
Climate and Morality 
People in northern climates were morally superior to 
people in other climates. In cold climates gratification 
was found in physical activities such as hunting, drinking, 
fighting, and traveling. These physical endeavors spawned 
in northerners a disdain for vice, a love of virtue, candid 
and sincere thoughts -- all attributes that epitomized moral 
and upright behavior. 56 The natural moral goodness 
encouraged by cold climates vitiated the need for laws 
designed to restrain behavior, particularly for women. 
In the Christian world, especially that of northern Europe, 
women were moral exemplars 
leurs moeurs sont naturellement bonnes; 
ou toutes leurs passions sont calmes, peu 
active, peu raffinees; ou l'amour a sur le 
coeur un empire si regle, que la moindre 
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police suffice pour les conduire. 57 
The moral behavior of European women benefited everyone. The 
public display of their charms never aroused jealousy or a 
lapse of morals because they "reserv[ed] themselves for the 
pleasures of one. 1158 An agreeable climate like Europe's had 
no need of an astute legislator to forbid behavior never 
contemplated. 
The moral uprightness characteristic of northerners 
gradually faded as one moved to the south. In warm 
climates, Montesquieu argued, "the soul is intensely moved 
by everything that relates to the union of the two sexes" 
because "it [love] ... (was] the sole cause of happiness; it 
... [was] life itself. 1159 There warmth stimulated the 
soul's response to everything but received physical 
satisfaction only in physical pleasure. There you would 
find that "the strongest passions will multiply ... crimes" 
because everyone sought personal satisfaction by whatever 
means possible. 60 Without the benefit of legislative 
proscription, inhabitants of warm climates were incapable of 
resisting their desires: "there are climates where the 
power of nature has such force that the moral has almost 
none." In such instances the separation of men and women 
was necessary; otherwise carnal desires would be constantly 
inflamed as a result of the prolonged mutual exposure of the 
sexes. 61 Admiring the practice of confining women in 
separate quarters in Turkey, Persia, China, the Mogul 
Empire, and Japan, Montesquieu stated that "the morals of 
the women are admirable" because of that custom. 62 
58 
In those places where "the physical power of ... (the] 
climate violate(d] the natural law of the two sexes and 
those of intelligent beings," a good legislator needed to 
make laws that would render climate's influence 
insignificant. Otherwise loathesome behavior would 
flourish. 63 India was a case in point. It was "there that 
one sees to what an extent the vices of climate, allowed 
great freedom, will carry licentiousness." The dominance of 
climate in India necessitated the physical separation of 
women, a law that was not forthcoming. 64 Thus jealousy 
among Indian women led to horrific crimes as they were 
allotted their freedom when the climate dictated 
otherwise. 65 
Inhabitants of temperate climates had neither the 
strict morality of northerners nor the intense passions of 
southerners. Thus they were inconsistent in their actions. 
Except for women in Europe, people in temperate climates did 
not exhibit "a quality determined enough to fix them [that 
is, manners, vices, and virtues] themselves" because the 
climate itself oscillated between extremes of hot and 
cold. 66 This was a significant departure from earlier 
assertions of the virtues of temperate climates. 
Nevertheless, Montesquieu limited his thesis of the moral 
indeterminacy of temperate climates to regions beyond 
Europe, for only in Europe had social conventions overcome 
the ambiguities characteristic of other temperate zones. 
The Need for Legislation in Poor Climates 
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Infirmities caused by climate were overcome only when 
legislators refused to submit to its dictates and 
promulgated laws designed to mitigate its effects. 67 Poor 
legislators let climate govern. In China "physical causes" 
inclined people to indolence but "the moral causes" of 
beneficent rule had hindered climate's domination: from the 
very beginning "the ... legislators of China were obliged to 
make very good laws" notwithstanding the poor climate. 
Chinese rulers recognized climate's effects and drafted laws 
in full consideration of it: "they made their religion, 
their philosophy and all their laws practical" in 
recognition of the need to shield their subjects from the 
climate. 68 According to Montesquieu the Emperor's yearly 
practice of "opening the ground" (feng and shan sacrifices) 
was an example of how implementing good laws could forestall 
climatic dominance because his actions established a pattern 
of behavior for his subjects to imitate. 
The well-articulated laws of China demonstrated that 
neither their customs nor form of government had changed in 
a thousand years. Such endurance was a testimonial to the 
virtues of positive laws. 69 The Chinese had not changed 
partly because of good laws and partly because they could 
not improve on the balance struck between a poor climate and 
the laws implemented to lessen its influence. They were 
suspended, unable to move either forward or backward. In 
respect to China Montesquieu concluded that, despite the 
resistance of the Chinese to change and progress, their 
history proved that climate need not remain dominant. 
Climate and Slavery 
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Although "slavery ... [was] against nature" it still 
appeared to be "founded on natural reason" in some 
countries, especially those of Asia, where the warm climate 
inclined people toward inactivity. 70 In Asian countries 
extreme heat rendered the body and mind "absolutely without 
strength." To overcome it a stimulus was needed. This 
stimulus was slavery, which forced people to do work that 
otherwise would be left undone. In China, India, and Turkey 
slavery conformed to physical laws because exercising the 
mind was much more exacting than arduous physical labor: 
for "the most part punishments will be less difficult to 
maintain than the functioning of the mind which is necessary 
for it to conduct itself. "71 People promptly submitted to 
slavery because it was less onerous than the mental exertion 
required to maintain one's autonomy. Even though explicable 
by an appeal to "natural reason," the use of slaves was 
especially pernicious for the state, master, and slave. 72 
Though understandable and marginally beneficial, slavery was 
never useful. Thus Montesquieu praised European countries, 
where the climate rendered slavery unreasonable or where 
astute lawgivers prohibited either its implementation or 
continuance. 
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Female slavery in Muslim countries was an example of 
slavery's existence as natural reason. There women's 
physical development preceded the attainment of reason 
because the warm climate accelerated physical maturation. 
For women youthful marriages meant a lifetime of 
"dependence" because by the time reason flowered, youth and 
beauty had wilted. 73 Compared to warm climates, temperate 
climates "naturally introduce[d] a type of equality between 
the two sexes" as physical and moral reason were realized 
together. Montesquieu used this argument on disparity 
between physical and moral development to explain why, in 
temperate climates, slavery too was absent. 
Climate and Religious Divisions 
Climate explained the geographical distribution of 
Islam and Christianity as no religion could be propagated 
beyond its "natural boundaries. 1174 Even though Christianity 
was the only true religion, the climates of non-Christian 
countries prevented its spread. This explained why Islam 
was accepted in Asia and encountered insurmountable problems 
in Europe. The physical causes that led to Islam's success 
in Muslim countries were similar to the causes of Asiatic 
despotism. The enervation of the mind and the body in warm 
climates worked for a despotic religion like Islam and 
against religious institutions promoting liberty. 75 
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The rupture in the Christian faith that occurred in the 
sixteenth century also originated from the different 
climates of northern and southern Europe. Although there 
was no extreme separation of the climates in Europe, there 
were distinct differences between north and south. Northern 
countries embraced Protestantism because they "have and will 
always have a spirit of independence and of liberty that the 
people of the south do not have." In the north the 
"independence of the climate" predisposed its inhabitants to 
repudiate Catholicism and to proclaim their religious 
autonomy. In the south, however, where people needed 
religious guidance and authority, Catholicism retained its 
authority. 76 
Climate in Asian and European History 
According to Montesquieu, the histories of Asia and 
Europe supported his assessment of their climates. Asian 
history demonstrated that the north always conquered the 
south. In Europe, however, from the beginning of recorded 
history to the present only "four great changes" had 
occurred: the conquests of the Roman Empire; its collapse 
at the hands of northern barbarians; the conquests of 
Charlemagne; and those of the Normans. Even though it had 
been the scene of repeated triumphs, the history of Europe 
differed from Asia's because following every conquest "a 
general strength (was] diffused through all the parts of 
Europe." This dispersion of power ensued from the 
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·conformity of Europe's climate. Empires or would-be 
empires, for example the Romans, had experienced problems 
when attempting to dominate all of Europe but had conquered 
Asia easily. 77 The ease with which European nations 
prevailed over the rest of the world was to be explained by 
the physical and mental benefits accruing from the temperate 
climate. Thus the problem of maintainirtg·an empire 
dissipated when European countries turned askance from 
attempts t<;> dominate Europe and focused on expanding their 
influence to other continents~n 
Conclusion 
Montesquieu's revival of climate theory occurred at a 
time when Europeans were becoming more knowledgeable about 
the many different kinds of societies in the world. 
Although Europe had kndwn of distant peoples for centuries -
- and had become even more familiar with them since the 
voyages of exploration -- the increased number of reports 
about these strange peoples and their "unorthodox" customs 
began to receive systematic consideration at a time when 
Europe itself was experiencing doubt. European recognition 
of these bizarre peoples had been postponed, but once 
systematic examination began the disquietude it stimulated 
was alleviated by an appeal to familiar ideas like climate. 
By invoking a long-held belief in climate, and using it 
to delineate how physical and moral aspects of life 
reciprocally influenced one another, Montesquieu redirected 
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the focus on climate and provided Europeans with a means for 
judging the quality of the moeurs and social institutions of 
exotic peoples that reinforced their own conviction of 
inherent superiority. Montesquieu clung to many of the 
hallowed precepts of climate, such as why northerners were 
lovers of liberty and southerners condemned to servitude, 
but he did so in a way that confirmed why Europe was 
animated by freedom, dependent almost exclusively on 
positive laws, while other countries, notably those of Asia 
and the Orient, in many ways passively reflected their 
physical surroundings. 
His investigation of climate left no doubt that he 
considered wholesale attachment to climate undesirable 
because it impeded the development of positive laws. 
Montesquieu never asserted that climate alone governed, only 
that 
plusieurs choses gouvernent les hommes: 
le climat, la religion, les lois, les 
maximes du gouvernement, les examples des 
choses passees, les moeurs, les manieres. 79 
When one of these influences "act[ed) with more force, the 
others in the same degree are weakened." Climate most 
influenced "savages; manners govern the Chinese; the laws 
tyrannize the Japanese; morals once had complete influence 
at Sparta; maxims of government and the ancient simplicity 
of manners once prevailed in Rome. 1180 As climate was "the 
first of all the empires," it followed that it most affected 
societies that had yet to develop distinctive social 
conventions and moeurs. 81 Once movement away from climate 
commenced, positive laws, manieres, moeurs, and tradition 
played an increasingly significant role. 82 
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The control exerted by climate hampered the development of 
positive laws that were characteristic of advanced 
societies. Nations that had developed positive laws and 
that were not controlled by the crude vestiges of physical 
laws were superior because they had moved beyond the 
dominance of climate. By appealing to the ancient idea of 
climate "objectively" Montesquieu helped to ease many of the 
doubts that were then questioning the very foundations of 
European society. Not only did Montesquieu provide an 
account of the many different kind of laws operating in 
different societies but he did so in a way that alleviated 
doubts about European society itself. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CLIMATE AND HUMAN VARIETIES IN 
BUFFON'S HISTOIRE NATURELLE 
Raised on much the same intellectual fare that nurtured 
the mature Montesquieu, George-Louis Leclerc, later the 
comte de Buffon, was born into a family of civil servants in 
Montbard in 1707. 1 Even though born a generation after 
Montesquieu, the same basic intellectual environment 
influenced Buffon: Cartesian rationality, Baconian-
Newtonian empiricism, and the sensationalist psychology of 
John Locke. 2 Although Cartesian physics had been partially 
discredited by Newton and his allies, it still remained 
influential well into the first half of the eighteenth 
century. More important still was the increased respect 
granted to Newton and the empiricist methods championed by 
the English. Lastly, Lockean sensationalism, receiving its 
most radical French exposition in the work of the abbe de 
Condillac, forcefully argued that sense impression and their 
recombination in the mind were the only possible source for 
ideas. 3 In eighteenth-century France these intellectual 
currents were variously combined to produce powerful 
justifications for the exploration of and theorizing on the 
relationships that existed in nature. 
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The new scientific way of viewing the world that 
emerged in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries encouraged the frenetic scrutiny of, and increased 
production of knowledge about Europe and lands beyond. 
Reports about strange lands inhabited by peoples noticeably 
different were at first a diversion for the idly curious but 
in the course of the eighteenth century sparked the European 
imagination and heightened awareness among Europeans of 
their own distinctiveness as a civilization. Exposure to 
such reports stimulated a desire to understand that which 
was different, investigate why such differences existed, and 
compare those foreign peoples to those of Europe. Not only 
did the acquisition of knowledge prompt questioning of many 
established assumptions guiding the thoughts, beliefs, and 
attitudes of Europeans, but it also led them to reaffirm the 
standards by which they lived and to belittle those of newly 
or recently discovered peoples. 4 
Natural history grew prodigiously in the eighteenth 
century and France became one of the most important centers 
for naturalist studies. The Jardin du roi was the place 
where animal and plant collections gathered on voyages of 
exploration were sent to in France. Buffon was appointed 
superintendent of the Jardin in 1739 and under his direction 
it quickly became the foremost repository of natural history 
collections in Europe. Soon after his selection as 
intendent, Buffon started to write what would become one of 
the most important works of eighteenth-century natural 
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history, the Histoire Naturelle. The first three volumes of 
the Histoire Naturelle were published in 1749 and they 
appeared regularly thereafter up to and through Buffon's 
death in 1788. 5 Buffon did not limit himself to the study 
of the plants and animals collected at the Jardin -- he also 
brought within his purview reports of exotic peoples that 
had cropped up with increasing frequency since the beginning 
of the eighteenth century. His effort to account for both 
the diversity and unity of nature and "man's" place in it 
led him to consider climate as one of the keys to unlocking 
the mystery of these different peoples. Buffon viewed 
climate as one of the principal determinants of physical 
appearance, nutrition, and, to some extent, moeurs. By 
positing a relationship between climate and different 
peoples, Buffon subscribed to many prevalent notions then 
circulating about climate, its operation and effects. But 
he did so in a way that modified traditional ideas about 
climate and allowed him to formulate a more sophisticated 
account than had Montesquieu. 6 Prime among these was his 
notion of "degeneration" and migration of the human 
"species." 7 
Buffon and the Definition of Natural History 
Buffon's competing yet sometimes complementary 
allegiances to Cartesianism, English empiricism, and 
sensationalism converged unevenly in his monumental work the 
Histoire Naturelle, Generale et Particuliere, ~ .!!!1§. 
74 
description du cabinet du roi (1749-88). Buffon's mixed 
intellectual parentage and his all-embracing effort to 
comprehend nature combined in him to occasion a unique 
scientific and literary work, the aim of which was to 
achieve an understanding of how nature, conceived in its 
broadest possible meaning, operated. It is only within this 
context of broad generalization that it is possible to 
comprehend Buffon's sensitivity to nature's tangled web, his 
rejection of classification systems founded on a few 
specific characteristics, and his suspicion of those who 
relied on mathematics to explain nature: 
the disadvantage here [of classificatory 
systems] is the tendency to overextend or 
to unduly constrict the chain of connections, 
to wish to subject the laws of nature to 
arbitrary laws, to wish to divide this chain 
where it is not divisible .... Another drawback 
... is the temptation to restrict oneself to a 
regime of overly-detailed methods, and thus to 
wish to judge the whole by a single instance, 
to reduce nature to the status of petty systems 
... to fashion arbitrarily just as many 
unconnected assemblages of date. 8 
Located in this statement is Buffon's justification for 
refusing to follow strictly either Newton's mathematical 
principles or Linnaeus's systematic classification of 
species and genus according to reproductive organs. 
Although Buffon himself greatly admired and sought to 
emulate Newton, he never hoped to achieve the same 
precision that Newton had in his physics. While 
acknowledging the enormous contributions made by the 
physical and mathematical sciences, Buffon considered their 
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methods inappropriate for the naturalist because they were 
human inventions -- issuing from the human mind -- that 
inhibited attempts to grasp nature's varied dimensions. He 
argued that an irreducible chasm separated the theoretical 
formulations of the hard sciences and the empirical reality 
of nature~ Nature was not geometric. 9 Attempts to apply 
geometric f ormuli to the complex operations of nature had 
added little real understanding to the processes by which 
nature worked. They revealed more about how the human mind 
worked than about nature operations -- nature was much too 
varied. 10 
Seeking to explain the seemingly inexhaustible variety 
of nature's powers, eighteenth-century naturalists rekindled 
the idea of a great chain of being. Convinced that 
imperceptible gradations linked together all things in an 
indivisible chain, Buffon settled on the chain of being as 
the only possible explanation for nature's profusion. 11 
Because of his faith in.the chain of being and in view of 
the breach he saw between theoretical pronouncements and 
nature's intricacies, Buffon opted for what he considered to 
be the only reliable method of study, descriptive analysis: 
The first causes of things will remain 
ever hidden from us, and the general 
results of these·causes will remain as 
difficult for us to know as the causes 
themselves. All that is given to us is 
to perceive certain particular effects, 
to compare these with each other, to 
combine them, and, finally, to recognize 
therein more of an order appropriate to 
our own nature than one pertaining to the 
existence of the things which we are 
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considering. 12 
Not only did Buff on reveal himself as a good Newtonian --
f oreswearing the search for final causes -- he also shunned 
mathematics because of its inherent limitations. Nothing 
but a descriptive science based on comparisons within nature 
itself could serve as a valid alternative; otherwise a 
naturalist's speculations would be sterile and abstract. 13 
According to Buffon, description must be founded on 
relationships subsisting in nature itself not categories 
devised to suit the classifier's needs. Although comparison 
lacked the theoretical rigor of the hard sciences, it 
offered compensation by contrasting and differentiating 
nature's elements with each other and with, most 
importantly, Buffon's ultimate point of reference, man. By 
drawing distinctions based on resemblances and differences, 
carefully discriminating between them, and then making broad 
generalizations, Buffon maintained that one could study 
nature systematically and at the same time remain 
sympathetic to its complex activities. 14 This approach is 
fully evident in Buffon's exploration of the relationship 
between climate and the human species. 
The Operation of Climate 
One element that Buf fon had recourse to in order to 
describe, explain and judge the reasons for physical 
differences and geographic distribution of human beings was 
climate. Climate exerted more influence on plants than 
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animals and more on animals than on humans. The mobility of 
people and animals left them less subject to climate than 
plants, which were restricted to a much smaller geographic 
area. 15 For the various 11 species 11 of humans Buf fon believed 
that climate played an important role that could help 
explain variety in physical appearance, social customs, and 
the levels of development attained by different peoples. 
The standard by which Buf fon judged the level of refinement 
realized by non-Europeans inevitably referred back to Europe 
-- the paragon of perfection achieved under a temperate 
climate. 16 His use of climate as a means of assessing and 
categorizing non-Europeans according to standards created, 
justified, and extolled by Europeans themselves was also a 
practice employed by Montesquieu in his effort to discover 
the 11 laws 11 of nations . 17 
Buf fon recognized that the argument that climate helped 
to determine skin color had a long history and he went to 
great lengths to demonstrate that Greek doctrines concerning 
the correlation between climate and skin color were 
essentially correct, notwithstanding their incomplete 
knowledge of the world's peoples, especially blacks in 
Africa. Buffon recognized that there were anomalies both in 
the climates of Africa and in the Greek doctrines concerning 
the correspondence of skin color to climate. One such 
anomaly was that many Africans farther south than the 
11 Nubians 11 were lighter than they. Yet although this seemed 
to nullify the argument that skin color corresponded to 
climate, Buffon steered his argument (and that of the 
Greeks) clear of this predicament by pointing to the role 
exerted by migration and the passage of time, for 
si l'on fait attention, d'un cote, a la 
migration des differents peuples, et, de 
l'autre, au temps qu'il faut peut-etre 
pour noircir ou pour blanchir une race, 
on verra que tout peut se concilier avec 
le sentiment des anciens. 18 
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The basic theory of a correlation between climate and color 
remained valid. The two things missing from the Greek 
doctrine that needed consideration to sustain their argument 
was the role of movement and the duration of exposure to the 
climate. 
Buffon resolved this problem of explaining the 
"blackness" of the "Nubians" by stating that they were the 
original inhabitants of Africa and were from their origin 
black; they would remain black "so long as they ... live(d] 
in the same climate" and did not intermingle with people of 
a different color. Other residents of Africa who were not 
as black as the Nubians -- for example, the Ethiopians and 
Abyssinians -- were close to whites in origin. They 
tirent leur origine des blancs, puisqu'ils 
ont la meme religion et les meme usages que 
les Arabes, et qu'ils leur ressemblent par 
la couleur, sont, a la verite, encore plus 
basanes que les Arabes meridionaux; mais 
cela meme prouve que, dans une meme race 
d'hommes, le plus ou moins de noir depend 
la plus ou moins grande ardeur du climat. 19 
Buf fon suggested that the swarthy complexion of the 
Ethiopians and the Abyssinians resulted from migration and 
intermixing with people of a different color. 
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However, the influence of migration from one climate to 
another and that of mixing did not alter or change color 
immediately; this was evident by the example of blacks 
living in climates far-removed from their original ones. 
Yet Buffon maintained his thesis that migration, intermix-
ture, and adoption of the prevailing customs in a different 
climate could bring about a gradual modification and 
eventual change of skin color: 
Il faut peut-etre plusieurs siecles et une 
successions d'un grand nombre de generations 
pour qu'une race blanche prenne par nuances 
la couleur brune, et devienne enfin tout a 
fait noire; mais il y a apparence qu'avec le 
temps un peuple blanc, transporte du nord a 
l'equateur, pourroit devenir brune et meme 
tout a fait noir, surtout si ce meme peuple 
changeoit de moeurs et ne se servoit pour 
nourriture que des productions du pays chaud 
dans lequel il auroit ete transporte. 20 
By adding a temporal index to his analysis of differences in 
colo'r, Buff on not only sought to redeem ancient theories but 
also to ground his explanation of human "species" 
differentiation on exposure to climate and the adoption of 
customs and eating habits specific to each. 
Yet Buffon was no absolute climatic determinist. 
Although climate was the first influence the naturalist 
examined when determining why people were certain colors, 
two other elements acted simultaneously with climate. The 
first was the kind of nourishment ingested and the second 
was "les moeurs." Climate directly affected the aliments 
available for consumption, whereas "les moeurs" impressed 
upon people distinctive habits and customs. Those people 
fortunate enough to live a well-ordered existence under a 
good government, those without the daily worries of hunger 
and thirst, would naturally lead an easier and better life 
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than the brutish hordes who merely survived from day to day. 
The constant scramble for nourishment characteristic of 
people who lived without society or good government, was 
symptomatic of an animal-like existence, a constant battle 
for survival that prevented civilized existence. 21 
On the Formation of Climates 
What exactly made up a climate for Buffon? According 
to him a climate included several elements in combination: 
on doit entendre par climat non seulement 
la latitude plus ou moins elevee, mais 
aussi la hauteur ou la depression des 
terres, leur voisinage OU leur eloignement 
des mers, leur situation par rapports aux 
vents, et surtout au vent d'est, toutes les 
circonstances, en un mot, qui concourent a 
former la temperature de chaque contree; car 
c'est de cette temperature, plus ou moins 
chaude OU froide, humide OU seche, que depend 
non seulement la couleur des hommes, mais 
l'existence meme des especes d'animaux et de 
plantes, qui tous affectent de certaines 
contrees, et ne se trouvent pas dans d'autres: 
c'est de cette meme temperature que depend par 
consequent la difference de la nourriture des 
hommes; seconde cause qui influe beaucoup sur 
leur temperament, leur naturel, leur grandeur 
et leur force. 22 
The outcome of this combination of factors was the air 
temperature which produced "the greatest ... the principal 
varieties" of human "species . "23 Air temperature depended 
on the elevation of the land, whether it was flat, 
undulating, hilly, or mountainous; distance from or 
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proximity to the sea; and location in relation to the winds, 
especially winds from the east. Another important element 
contributing to a climate's temperature was the humidity or 
dryness of the air. Thus the specific mixture of these 
elements formed climates. 24 
The plants and animals required for survival in a 
region were important to classifying the savagery or 
civility of peoples. 25 On the one hand, a strong, well-
endowed physical appearance was proof that people benefited 
from a mild, temperate climate. In the Old World where, for 
example, the forests were cleared and the land cultivated, 
the climate altered by human agents, large plants and 
animals flourished and provided humans with excellent 
nourishment. 26 On the other hand, inhabitants of 
impoverished climates (either too hot or too cold) were 
inhabited by small weak plants and animals owing to the 
temperature, the aridity or moistness of the air, and the 
sterility of the land. 27 Poor climates thus occasioned both 
physical and mental weakness among inhabitants -- inferior 
in temperament, character, size, and strength. 28 
Buffon explained human difference with his theory of 
"degeneration" which postulated an original prototype from 
which all other species had degenerated. 29 For humans the 
prototype was the white European living in the European 
temperate climate, extending from forty to fifty degrees 
latitude. This was the area of the earth where humans came 
closest to perfection: 
c'est sous ce climat qu'on doit prendre 
l'idee de la vrai couleur naturelle de 
l'homme; c'est la qu'on doit prendre le 
modele OU l'unite a laquelle il faut 
rapporter toutes les autres nuances de 
couleur ou de beaute: les deux extremes 
sont egalement eloignes du vrai et du 
beau. 30 
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The greater part of Europe, extending from Georgia westward, 
possessed people who were "the most beautiful and the best 
made" in the world. 31 All non-Europeans were debased types 
that had developed in the course of migration, long exposure 
to hostile climates, and pernicious social customs. People 
who lived in climates less perfect suffered from having to 
consume coarse and unwholesome nutrients, which contributed, 
along with the poor climate, to degeneration. All those who 
were subjected to the twin evils of a less than benign 
climate and poor nourishment and "who live miserably[,] are 
ugly and poorly made. 1132 To be miserable was to lack the 
amenities necessary for physical beauty, good government, 
and excellent customs. Every human "species" that did not 
live in the European climate suffered -- some more, some 
less from want of a completely civilized life. 
Climate and Its Effects on People 
By formulating the idea of degeneration -- a gradual 
perversion of the prototype -- and using it in conjunction 
with his climate theory, Buffon determined the level of 
development reached by different societies. Just as he 
judged climates according to hot, temperate, and cold, 
Buffon extended his judgment about climate to its 
inhabitants. A pristine, mild one such as Europe's, was 
beneficial, whereas the climates of, for example, South 
America were "covered with woods [and] a group of 
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inaccessible, uninhabitable mountains" that made it 
especially difficult to create or sustain a vibrant 
society. 33 The climate of South America virtually assured 
that no society there would ever reach a level of 
development approaching the standards set by Europeans. The 
"New World" did not denote simply a newly discovered land 
but a land that was physically new. Thus the ground was 
still moist because post-diluvian waters had only recently 
receded, hence the humidity was so thick that the sun's heat 
penetrated and dispersed it only with difficulty. 34 
The monotonous uniformity of the New World climate 
explained both the lack of variety of human "species" --
and, especially, the absence of blacks in its torrid zone. 
For sharp contrasts of hot and cold did not exist in South 
America because of the humidity, the mountain ranges, and 
the east winds that blew from the Atlantic. 35 In addition, 
because the New World was sparsely populated no civilizing 
activity had altered the physical environment. 36 The 
assorted climates of the Old World stood in marked contrast 
to the unvaried New World climate: "in the New World the 
temperature of the climates is more equal than in the Old 
World." Several reasons accounted for the temperature 
differential of the torrid zones in Africa and in the New 
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World. In South America the elevation of the land, the 
snow-capped mountain peaks (which cool the air), huge 
rivers, and forests increased the humidity, lowered the air 
temperature, and created a uniform human "species." In 
addition 
on doit observer que le vent d'est, qui 
scuffle constamment entre les tropiques, 
n'arrive au Brasil, a la terre des Amazones, 
et a la Guiane, qu'apres avoir traverse une 
vaste mer, sur laquelle il prend de la 
fraicheur qu'il porte ensuite sur toutes 
les terres orientales de l'Amerique equinoxale: 
c'est par cette raison, aussi bien que par la 
quantite des eaux et des forets, et par 
l'abondance et la continuite de pluies, que 
ces parties de l'Amerique sont beaucoup plus 
temperees qu'elles ne le seroient en effet 
sans ces circonstances particulieres. 37 
These reasons summed up Buffon's explanation of why such 
contrasts in color separated the people living in the same 
latitudes in the Old and New Worlds. For Buffon the eastern 
wind explained why South American natives were not black. 
If the east winds did not bring cool, fresh air to South 
America, its inhabitants would have been much darker. 
Buffon's attitude toward a lack of variety was one of 
condescension: small of size, few in number, and incapable 
of altering their surroundings signaled to him that the 
climate and inhabitants of South America were backward. 
Buff on added one other element to his argument 
explaining why there was such uniformity among the people of 
the New World, particularly among those living in southern 
and central parts: their savagery or only recently 
established civility. 38 It was obvious to Buffon that the 
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New World was a fresh and wild land, particularly ill-suited 
for the development of a well-ordered society. Even with 
the aggressive importation of European society (especially 
by the Spanish), South America remained "savage [and] 
uncultivated. 1139 Although the people of Mexico and Peru had 
established governments, laws, and handed down customs from 
generation to generation, they were still in their infancy 
compared to those of other continents. The Peruvians 
themselves "could only count twelve kings" and thus had 
emerged from a savage state less than three hundred years 
earlier. 40 This was hardly time enough to have formed the 
kind of tradition needed for the creation of good social 
institutions and customs worthy of a completely civilized 
people. 
Feebleness and Climate 
The feebleness Buff on found characteristic of New World 
inhabitants resulted, in part, from their lack of a large 
population, which partially explained their inability to 
subdue and master their surroundings. Because nature was 
unrefined, raw and undeveloped, so too were New World 
residents -- they were powerless before their climate 
unable to escape the confines of their miserable 
existence. 41 A vicious circle of climatic dominance and 
physical dependence proved to Buff on that the New World was 
inferior and would long remain so. 42 
Where far from making himself master of 
this territory as his own domain, he rule[s] 
over nothing; where having never subjugated 
either animals or the elements ... he is no 
more than an animal of the first order ... 
powerless to change nature or to assist her. 43 
Europeans, because of the mildness of their temperate 
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climates, were less influenced by their surroundings and, in 
addition, were stronger, more sensitive, and less cowardly 
than people in the New World. 44 The lack of good manners 
demonstrated that the savages did not have any of the 
prerequisites -- law, social organization, common goals 
necessary for civilization. In regions 
ou il n'y a ni regle, ni loi, ni maitre, 
ni societe habituelle, est moins une nations 
qu'un assemblage tumultueux d'hommes barbares 
et independants, qui n'obeissent qu'a leurs 
passions particulieres, et qui, ne pouvant 
avoir un interet commun, sont incapables de 
se diriger vers un meme but et de se soumettre 
a des usages constant. 45 
The difficult terrain, torrential rains, unfavorable air 
temperature, and high humidity lessened the chances for 
civilization to establish itself firmly in the New World. 
Buf fon partially lessened this harsh indictment of the 
American savage by suggesting that vice and depravity issued 
from civilization, "that virtue belongs more to savage man 
than to civilized man. "46 Still despite the occasional 
Rousseauism, Buffon generally argued that civilized 
societies were much better off than savage peoples. 47 
Climate in Asia and Africa 
When discussing people that inhabited parts of greater 
Asia, particularly the Laplanders, Russians, and those 
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farther to the east, Buffon assigned them all to the same 
type of climate (cold and uninhabitable for all other 
nations). Not only did they live under similar climates but 
they all had "approximately the same inclinations and even 
the same customs; they are all equally uncivilized, 
superstitious, and stupid." Likewise, their physical 
appearance conformed to their inferior and ferocious 
customs; they were "a small race of men with bizarre faces, 
the countenance of which is as savage as their manners. 1148 
While their appearance indicated a brutal disposition, their 
superstitions demonstrated that they were a miserable lot; 
they had conception "neither of religion nor of a Supreme 
Being." Because they were idolatrous, susceptible to the 
most aberrant beliefs, they were "more uncivilized than 
savages, without courage, without respect for themselves, 
shameless; these despicable people have only mores enough to 
be contemptible. 1149 Even when compared to the moral 
sensibilities of the most depraved European, these people 
were devoid of all notions of civilized behavior. 
Buffon's examination of the Japanese, Chinese, and 
Tartars centered on his contention that they were all 
related in spite of apparent differences. According to 
Buffon, the differences separating the Tartars from the 
Chinese, that is, facial characteristics, size, and customs 
were superficial and hid a more fundamental unity: "we can 
scarcely doubt that they [the Chinese] have much more in 
common with the Tartars than with any other people." The 
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discrepancies that did exist were ascribable "to the climate 
and to the mix of races."~ In China a fruitful soil and 
benevolent climate in conjunction with nearness to the ocean 
had promoted the growth of a sophisticated society. 
Tartary, however, remained isolated, cut off from 
intercourse with other people; the geographic seclusion of 
the Tartars forced them to "remain wanderers in their vast 
deserts under the sky, the rigor of which can only support 
tough and uncivilized men. "51 Because the Tartars, like all 
migratory peoples, were constantly moving and never settled, 
they could not form a society capable of customs or morals 
approaching those of Europeans. The difficulty of survival 
from day to day precluded them from such efforts. 
The similarities in appearance and customs of the 
Japanese and the Chinese showed that they were from "one and 
the same race." Their physical differences were immaterial 
and disguised the true nature of their relationship; 
although the Japanese were "more yellow or brown because 
they live(d] in a more southern climate" their darker skin 
was minor compared to the features that united them. 
Physically both had black hair, small eyes, wide faces and 
flat noses, and little if any facial hair. In addition to 
physical similarities, inhabitants of these two countries 
were 
fort altier, aguerris, adroits, vigoureux, 
civil et obligeant, parlant bien, feconds 
en compliments, mais inconstants et fort 
vains; ils supportent avec une constance 
admirable la faim, la soif, le froid, le 
chaud, les veilles, la fatigue et toutes 
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les incommodi tes de la vie. 52 
The Chinese and the Japanese were proud and haughty and 
sustained themselves admirably when subjected to life's 
hardships. Yet they did not measure up to European 
standards physically, intellectually, or socially. Both 
remained substantially behind Europe in terms of their 
refinement. Nevertheless, the Japanese and the Chinese were 
well-versed in "the arts and in all of the crafts," and 
except for strange customs like footbinding, were quite 
civilized (polices).~ 
Buffon was convinced that while there was a "uniformity 
in the color and in the shape of the natural inhabitants of 
America" the opposite was true for Africans. Whereas 
America was a New Land sparsely peopled, Africa was old and 
heavily populated. There the climate was variable and the 
people markedly differentiated: 
brulant, et cependant d'une temperature 
tres inegale suivant les differentes 
contrees; et les moeurs des differentes 
peuples sont aussi toutes differents .... 
Toutes ces causes ont done concouru pour 
produire en Af rique une variete dans 
les hommes plus grande que partout 
ailleurs. 54 
The age of the African continent, the variety of peoples and 
moeurs followed from the type of climate in which they 
lived. People living on the northern reaches of Africa, 
from the Barbary coast eastward, were situated under "the 
temperate zone on this side of the tropic" and were 
influenced by the Mediterranean. Because of the mild 
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temperatures, the product both of air coming off the 
Mediterranean and the snows atop of the Atlas Mountains, 
"the men there are white and only a little swarthy." As one 
moved to the south the heat increased because of the 
distance from both the mountains and the Mediterranean. 
Progressing southward, into the tropical zones, "the heat 
becomes much greater and the men are very brown but they are 
not yet black."" 
Further to the south, around seventeen to eighteen 
degrees latitude, the extreme heat accounted for the 
blackness of the inhabitants. According to Buffon, 
travellers had reported temperatures of up to thirty-eight 
degrees centigrade in Senegal and these reports confirmed, 
in his opinion, that air temperature determined skin color. 
Although lacking statistical evidence about the temperature 
in "Nubia," Buffon surmised from travel reports that the 
temperature there was quite hot. One of the main reasons 
for the hot air in "Nubia" was the winds which 
echauffent l'air au point que le vent 
du nerd des Nubiens doit etre un vent 
brulant; d'autre cote le vent d'est, 
qui regne le plus ordinairement entre 
les tropiques, n'arrive en Nubie qu' 
apres avoir parcouru les terres de 
l'Arabie, sur lesquelles il prend une 
chaleur que le petit intervalle de la 
mer Rouge ne peut guere temperer. 56 
As a result of the east wind, Nubians were very black, much 
blacker than the people of Senegal. The winds that finally 
reached the Nubians did so only after having traversed most 
of Arabia, soaking up the heat from the land, which made 
living there "unbearable. 1157 
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Thus Buffon concluded that under the tropics in Africa, 
people in the west "feel and experience a much greater heat" 
than those in the east where "the east wind 
arrives ... with a freshness it gained while travelling 
across a vast ocean." In western Africa the torrid zone was 
the hottest in the world and because of the intense heat, 
the blacks were the "blackest of all. 1158 To the east, 
mainly as a result of cool ocean breezes, the people were 
lighter; "the pronounced differences between these two types 
of blacks comes from the heat of the climate, which is very 
great in all parts of the east [of Africa] but is excessive 
in western Africa. 1159 Buff on further developed his theory 
by arguing that all other peoples residing under the torrid 
zone (to the east and west of Africa) were "extremely 
brown," if seldom black. The reason for this, according to 
Buffon, was that the majority of these people lived on or 
near islands (or in the New World) exposed to winds that 
passed over broad stretches of water that cooled the air. 60 
Thus concluded Buffon "one finds negroes only in the earth's 
climates where all the circumstances are joined together to 
produce constant and excessive heat. 1161 
Two other pieces of evidence confirmed for Buf fon his 
view that air temperature accounted for skin color. The 
first came from a dissection performed on a black in 1702 
where the exposed foreskin of the penis was black, while the 
92 
skin protected from exposure remained white. The second 
piece of evidence, and perhaps much more important for 
Buffon, was that "children [of blacks] are born white or 
rather red, like other men: but two or three days after 
they are born their color changes ... and by the seventh or 
eighth day they are all black. "62 Buff on concluded that 
only an external agent was capable of such alterations in 
skin color. 
Because of Buffon's belief that air temperature was 
the principal mechanism affecting skin color he theorized 
that over a long duration skin color could change because of 
exposure to a different climate: 
il ya ... toutes les raisons du monde 
pour presumer que, comme elle ne vient 
originairement que de l'ardeur du climat 
et de l'action longtemps continuee de la 
chaleur, e11e s'effaceroit peu a Beu par 
la temperature d'un climat froid. 3 
Thus if blacks were moved from their native climate to a 
temperate or cold one "their descendants in the eighth, 
tenth, or twelfth generations would be much less black than 
their ancestors and perhaps as white as the native peoples 
of the cold climate. 1164 A slow and gradual process of 
change could eventually undo the effects of climate. 
Exposure to the sun and the temperature of the air accounted 
for skin color because "the same causes that darken us when 
we [Europeans] are exposed to the heat of the air and sun" 
worked in a much stronger fashion on Africans. 65 
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Climate and Monogenism 
Although Buffon spent his life studying nature and its 
immense profusion, when it came to categorizing the peoples 
he discussed he was at pains to show that despite diversity 
they had a single origin and that whatever differences 
existed -- physically, intellectually, morally -- resulted 
from the action of external factors that over time altered 
them. Never the sentimentalist when discussing the 
differences between savage and civilized life, Buffon 
nonetheless sought to account for both diversity and unity 
in the human species. 66 Actually diversity of the human 
species derived from unity: the prototype model -- the 
white European -- served as Buffon's exemplar and permitted 
him to validate empirically the theory of "degeneration," 
the role of migration, and the effects of external agents, 
especially climate by. 67 Migration, exposure to hot or cold 
climates, and poor nourishment contributed adversely to 
residents of such areas. Not only did a poor climate cause 
degeneration but it led also to pernicious customs, 
superstitious beliefs, moral turpitude. 68 Skin color and 
the excellence of customs and morals were inextricably 
linked in Buffon's analysis and the further he descended 
down the scale of civilization the less were his discoveries 
palatable. Yet to descend from the heights to the depths of 
civilization was to remain within the same general framework 
of humanity because external factors causing degeneration 
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were reversible and, in fact, linked all humans by infinite 
gradations. 69 Degeneration served a dual function. It 
explained the divisions and subdivisions of the human 
species that had manifested themselves through the course of 
history. 70 And it served too as a justification for the 
gentle tone with which Buffon lauded Europe and lambasted 
those "species" who had deviated from the European 
prototype. Over the long sweep of history these human 
species had dispersed, exposed themselves to adverse 
climates and unhealthy nourishment, branched off from one 
another and diverged in physical appearance, intellect, 
custom, and moeurs yet they remained connected by the unity 
of their origin. 71 
Conclusion 
Buffon's method of scientific description, his 
commitment to promoting his method of natural history, and 
his eloquent style made him the foremost theorist of natural 
history in eighteenth-century France. When he invoked the 
enduring theme of climate he did so in the scientific 
method of observation, comparison, and description. Thus he 
integrated climate theory into his overall scientific 
method. The inundation of reports about these exotic 
peoples, the incomprehension that confronted Europeans when 
they realized that they were one among many, demanded 
explanation. This Buffon duly furnished. And in doing so 
he reinforced the belief that climate profoundly affected 
95 
the physical appearance, customs, and beliefs of different 
peoples and at the same time reaffirmed the unity of all 
humanity by developing a sophisticated monogenist argument 
that took into consideration migration, nourishment, length 
of exposure to the sun, and the various elements that 
constituted climate. By scientifically citing climate as a 
physical component that produced the varieties of peoples 
and contributed to their physical, mental, and moral 
constitution, Buffon committed himself to an enterprise 
that attested ·to European superiority because of its 
temperate climate which allowed -for laws, good customs and 
government, in a word, civilization. In Buffon an attitude 
of incredulity, softened by the recognition that climate 
carried with it certain maxims that were difficulty for 
people to overcome, were combined to produce an explanation 
for difference of physical appearance and color, nutrition, 
and moeurs. 
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CLIMATE'S ROLE IN EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURY FRANCE: CONCLUSION 
Montesquieu and Buffon were not the only writers to 
consider the problem of climate and its influence. No other 
doctrines were so fully elaborated as those of Montesquieu 
or Buffon, but they were still prevalent. In general ideas 
concerning climate existed for several reasons: the 
tradition of ascribing to climate characteristics that made 
it easier to categorize people according to physical 
appearance and mental capacities, a tradition whose origins 
reached back to antiquity; the efforts of Montesquieu and 
Buf fon to make sensible the tremendous varieties of peoples 
they came upon when composing their works; and lastly the 
efforts of many lesser-known writers. 
With this in mind we will now turn briefly to the 
Academie Royale des Sciences of Paris and Diderot's 
Encyclopedie to see how climate was conceived in these two 
avenues for the dissemination of knowledge. In the Academy 
of Sciences after 1750 inchoate and often unarticulated 
references were made to climate but mostly these references 
were concerned with air, its temperature and quality in each 
climate or the weather of a particular area or climate zone 
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-- seldom if ever were ideas about climate and weather drawn 
together as they had been in Montesquieu or Buffon. In the 
case of the Encyclopedie reference to climate was more 
explicit and less equivocal and almost without exception 
supported Montesquieu's view that climate profoundly 
infuenced laws, manners, and moeurs of societies. 
The Academy of Sciences in Paris 
Founded by the French crown at the behest of a small 
coterie of scientists in 1666, the Academy of Sciences 
eventually came to occupy a strategic location in the French 
scientific landscape. Until its dissolution in August 1793 
by the National Convention, the Academy was the most 
prestigious scientific institution in Europe, small in the 
number of initiates, circumspect in its policy of 
admissions. 1 Yet when first created the Academy toiled in 
the shadows of its cross-channel rival -- the Royal Society 
of London -- principally because it lacked the spirited 
intellectual atmosphere that served the Society profitably 
during the seventeenth century. 2 
But after the turn of the century the fortunes of these 
two stalwarts of scientific activity reversed relative to 
one another. In the course of the eighteenth century the 
Paris Academy eclipsed the Royal Society as the most 
prestigious scientific organization in Europe. One of the 
main reasons for this reversal had to do with the strong 
financial and institutional support the French crown 
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provided the Academy -- a state of affairs that had also 
accounted for its lack of success commensurate to the Royal 
Society in the previous century. 3 
The crown's recognition and support were both a 
blessing and a blight for the functioning of the Academy. 
It was a blessing in that financial pressures eased for 
those who became members, which allowed them to pursue 
science in a congenial institutional setting. In addition 
the policies and procedures drawn .up by the Academy and the 
crown separated the knowing savant from the part-time 
scientist and, more importantly, from the charlatan. 4 Yet 
it was a blight.to the Academy in that members were often 
forced to delay their own research in order to pronounce on 
matters which the crown requested expert opinion. But even 
this detour contained. unexpected benefits. As it was 
recognized as the repository of scientific and technical 
expertise, the Academy assumed the position of arbiter of 
knowledge, able to approve or disapprove any invention or 
scientific treatise submitted for its review. 5 
The original vision of the Academy as a communal effort 
where scientists worked together for the furtherance of 
knowledge was quickly recognized as unworkable. Thus by the 
mid-1680s the Academy abandoned its original ideal in favor 
of individual research and competition, reserving for itself 
only the right to stand as judge of scientific competence. 6 
The official change of policy occurred with the formal 
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revision of the Acadmey's Charter in 1699, which ushered in 
a period of remarkable institutional growth. 7 
The structure of the Academy, like that of all 
institutions of the Old Regime, was corporatist -- a 
reflection of French society. It was hierarchical, with 
special privileges granted to those with full membership. 
Membership levels ranged from the honoraires -- who were 
chosen because of social rank -- to the associes libres, 
whose only right was to attend sessions of the Academy. In 
between and in descending order were the pensionnaires, 
associes, and adjoints. The total number of Parisian 
members hovered around seventy, omissions being made 
whenever the crown or the Academy deemed it expedient to 
grant exceptions. In addition to its Parisian membership 
the Academy developed an extensive network of contacts 
throughout Europe. These ranged from the associes 
regnicoles (Frenchmen from the provinces) to an honorary 
category for foreign members. 8 Work done under the 
Academy's auspices was published in its Histoire et Memoires 
de .l'Academie Royale des Sciences (1699-1792). The Histoire 
was the preserve for members' publications, and the Memoires 
were for those outside Paris who submitted research judged 
worthy by the Paris Academy. 9 
Within this institutional framework ideas about climate 
and its influence existed, ideas that seem muted, shorn of 
the theoretical rigor or centrality attributable to the 
theories of Montesquieu or Buffon. Nevertheless, references 
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to climate demonstrate that it still occupied a role of 
measured, if diminished importance. But these references 
were ambiguous, unable to break from the traditional 
association of climates with the parallels of latitude yet 
at the same time moving slowly toward a definition of 
climate more attuned to those proffered by Montesquieu or 
Buffon. 
Climate in the Academy of Sciences 
A principal concern that appears repeatedly in the 
Academy's publications was with the quality and the 
differences of air in various locations . 10 It was "our 
principal nourishment," of which humans could not be 
"entirely deprived." The quality of air depended upon the 
surrounding land from which "air acquires different 
qualities by the evaporation that rises from the earth." 
Because land varied greatly -- marshes, woods, fields, 
congested cities -- air took on qualities peculiar to each 
location. Thus in heavy thick soil and in marshy lands the 
air was dominated by "sulphurs, salts, (and] minerals" but 
where "woods and fields" prevailed flowers or pasture land 
would fill the air with an aromatic sweetness. City air was 
particularly harmful because of the inhabitants' 
"transpiration," the crowded conditions, and the smoke which 
caused infections to spread quickly. From this it was 
surmised that "therefore each climate, each place has a 
different air, which changes itself with the seasons" and 
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was the "natural cause of popular diseases," especially 
where "the land produces a harmful vapor."ll Any place that 
was enclosed, where the air could not circulate properly 
increased the danger of disease because "corrupted air is a 
fruitful source of illness." 12 But since "the constitution 
of living bodies [is] always proportionate to the nature of 
the earth," the original inhabitants of a region always 
suffered less than those from places with a different air. 13 
One vexing problem was the different air temperatures 
of France and Canada even though they were situated in the 
same "climates." "The difference in the temperature of 
these two countries" was "considerable" even though their 
"climates seem to be the same. 1114 According to M. De Caire 
there had been "three principal causes adduced for the 
severe cold" in Canada: the large snowfalls; Canada's 
proximity to the North Sea; and the "elevation of the land" 
and the numerous waterfalls. 15 De Caire was opposed to 
these causes just as he disagreed with the "famous M. 
Halley" who hypothesized that the northernmost part of 
Canada "was formerly very close to the [north] pole" but 
that it had since moved southward. He dismissed Halley's 
theory by stating that even though "our globe had endured 
great changes" such explanations were preposterous and 
"abuse notions that ... are useful ... to explain nature's 
phenomena . " 16 
Neither could he countenance the opinion that the 
mountains in Canada accounted for the extreme cold because 
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they were "further from Quebec than the Alps and the 
Pyrenees (were] from Paris," proof, in his estimation, that 
they were not the source. In place of these multiple causes 
De Caire substituted one, the winds from the northwest which 
were "the sole and unique cause of all the cold in Canada." 
They accounted not only for the cold winters by "bring(ing] 
about changes in the cold or warm air of regions they [had] 
traversed" but 
c'est par les vents qui viennent de la 
Siberie, qu'a Astracan, ville situe 
au 46d 22' de latitude, la liqueur du 
thermometre descend jusqu'au 24e degre 
~ au-dessous de la congelation; & c'est 
aussi par le meme principe, quoique 
l'effet soit different, que le vent qui 
vient d'Afrique apporte a Malte, pendant 
l'ete, une chaleur insupportable. On 
pourroit citer d'autres lieux de la terre, 
ou les vents produisent encore les memes 
effets. 17 
Not only did northwest winds cause the cold Canadian 
winters, the same principle with different results applied 
everywhere and allowed the observer to discern where the 
dominant air temperature of any region originated. Although 
not used in conjunction with the word climat, the same ideas 
informed de Caire's thinking about the causes of climate 
that Buffon had used with greater force and creativity in 
his concern with its effects. Of course De Caire set for 
himself the infinitely less difficult task of explaining why 
Canada was so bitterly cold in the winter instead of why 
there were so many different plants, animals, and peoples. 
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An important publication that allowed Buff on to put 
forth and make respectable his La Theorie de la Terre was a 
treatise submitted by Jean Jacques d'Ortous de Mairan. 
Mairan had followed Fontenelle as secretary of the Paris 
Academy of Sciences in 1741 after the latter's death. 182 In 
1765 Mairan added a supplement to a paper first presented to 
the Academy in 1719 and expanded in 1749 . 19 Mairan 
theorized that the sun was not the only source of heat and 
posited instead that the combination of the sun's rays and 
the earth's "internal fire" warmed the earth. He collected 
vast amounts of data on air temperature in the winter and 
summer throughout the world and correlated them with the 
amount of sunlight any given place received. In addition to 
the air temperature and the earth's "internal fire" there 
were "local and accidental causes" for temperature variation 
in the same climate such as location, topography, and 
proximity to water. 20 But still there was no correlation 
drawn between his theory of air temperature, his 
meteorological observations, and the new definition of 
climate listed by the Academie FranQaise. 21 To Mairan 
climate was still a geographical designation based on the' 
parallels of latitude. 22 Indeed from his calculations he 
concluded that under each climate 
une infinite de causes locales, telle 
que des bois, des eaux, la hauteur du 
sol, la nature du terrein, & c. peuvent 
troubler cette uniformite [of reports 
from the same latitudes that differed]; 
mais en prenant un milieu, comme on 
fait toujours en pareille occasions, M. 
de Mairan arrive a cette etonnante 
conclusion, que la plus grande chaleur 
de l'ete est la meme dans tous les climats 
depuis l'Equateur jusqu'aux cercles 
polaires, tandis que les hivers y sont 
prodigieusement differens. 23 
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Mairan was a well-respected scientist and his authority made 
his theory of the earth's internal heat more plausible and 
rationally explained different temperatures in the same 
latitude. 24 Yet three years after the Academie Frangaise 
had officially revised the definition of climate, Mairan 
remained attached to the traditional meaning. Thus among 
many scientists and contributors to the Histoire and 
Memoires the longstanding notion of climatic zones still 
dominated scientific discussion of weather. 
The "Encyclopedie" 
The Encyclopedie, .QY. dictionnaire raisonne des 
sciences, des arts et des metiers (1751-65) was the most 
important publishing venture of the eighteenth century. 
Its guiding ideal was to create in an easily accessible 
format a vast compendium of human knowledge. Its chief 
purpose to collect useful knowledge for practical 
purposes. 25 To dispel superstition and to break the 
stronghold of traditional learning were the goals set by 
Denis Diderot and Jean d'Alembert, the two principal 
collaborators in the Encylopedie's production. 26 
The original ideal of an encyclopedie started modestly. 
The first proposal was to translate into French Ephraim 
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Chambers' Cyclopedia pupblished in 1728 in 1745. Diderot 
and d'Alembert entered into the picture innocently enough at 
first -- Diderot as a translator and d'Alembert as a 
consultant on mathematical questions. But by 1747 Diderot 
assumed editorial control of the project and d'Alembert 
became an important contributor. Now the Encyclopedie was 
no longer to be merely a translation of Chambers's work; the 
more ambitious goal was set to fill in the gaps left by 
Chambers. By June 1751 the first of eight proposed volumes 
(and two volumes of plates) was published and then followed 
quickly by a second. 27 Given that the purpose of the 
Encyclopedie·was to gather under one heading all useful 
human knowledge it was not surprising that the original 
proposal was inadequate; eventually it expanded to include 
seventeen volumes with eleven more of engravings. In its 
final form the Encyclopedie was a work characteristic of the 
Enlightenment's desire to bring to the educated public all 
"branches of human knowled,ge" from which they could draw 
effective principles for everyday application. 28 
Climate in the Encyclopedie 
When the article "Climat" (1755) first appeared in the 
Encyclopedie the term still carried the traditional meaning 
of the parallels of latitude. According to the Encyclopedie 
a climate was a 
portion ou zone de la surface de la terre, 
terminee par deux cercles paralleles a 
l'equateur, & d'une longeur telle que le 
plus long jour dans le parallele le plus 
proche du pole .... les climats se prennent 
done depuis l'equateur jusqu'aux poles, 
& sont comme autant de bandes ou de zones 
paralleles a l'equateur: mais il y a a 
rigueur plusieurs climats dans la longueur 
de chaque zone. 8 
After presenting the definition as found in the Academie 
Frangaise, the article provided a brief etymology of the 
word from its Greeks origins. The Greeks had initially 
recognized only seven climates, only five were habitable. 
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However, since the voyages of discovery had commenced "the 
moderns" had realized the Greek's errors and now recognized 
"thirty climates on each side" of the equator. 30 
After reciting the official and the Greek meaning of 
climate the article offered the "general" definition of 
climate which was 
une terre differente d'une autre, par 
rapport aux saisons, aux qualites de 
la terre, ou meme aux peuples qui y 
habitent, sans aucune relation aux plus 
grands jours d, ete. 31 
Thus "climate" was recognized as a geographical designation 
but included the seasons, the nature of the land, and the 
inhabitants of the particular location under examination 
with no reference to the length of the longest day of the 
year. Climate's were not associated with one particular 
type of weather because many factors contributed to 
different temperatures in the same climate: 
une infinite de circonstances, comme !es 
vents, !es volcans, le voisinage de la mer, 
la position des montagne, se compliquent 
avec !'action du soleil, & rendent souvent 
la temperature tres-dif ferente dans des 
lieux places sous le meme parallele. 32 
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No facile connection between climatic zone and temperature 
was proposed, instead all these physical factors must be 
considered jointly in order to understand the operation of a 
climate. Not only does this excerpt strongly suggest that 
the old definition of climate as a parallel of latitude was 
disappearing but that notions of what constituted a climate 
as defined by the greatest modern climate theorists, 
Montesquieu and Buffon were starting to prevail. Explicit 
reference is made to Montesquieu, "the illustrious author of 
l'esprit des leis," and his examination of the "influence of 
·the climate on the moeurs, the character, and the laws of 
people." The presence of heat made for a "weak body and 
lively imagination," which in turn encouraged laziness. 
Such a situation could be corrected only by "wise 
legislators" who "must ... by their laws encourage work 
instead of favoring indolence." But what had in fact 
happened in such climates was that the speculative mind of 
inhabitants of warm climates had been led to "dervichisme," 
that is monkery. 33 The inhabitants of India were 
specifically cited as an example of how positive laws must 
incite work to offset the natural tendency to laziness. 34 
Physicians too recognized the importance of climate but 
they used "climate" as "the exact synonym for temperature." 
Thus it was much more restricted in usage and differed 
greatly from "the sum of all the general or physical causes 
that can act on the health of inhabitants." Yet in order to 
understand climate's tremendous influence completely it was 
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important to take into consideration all the combined 
factors that Montesquieu and Buffon had previously 
enumerated: air, wind, water, the sun, quality of the food. 
From their consideration one could deduce the combination of 
factors or the one dominant factor most important in forming 
the physical characteristics of a people, specifically 
"height ... vigor ... skin and hair color ... the length of 
life • . . and disease. "35 
Climate also effected the moeurs and customs of diverse 
peoples. Those who lived in warm, temperate, and cold 
climates differed not only physically but in their actions. 
In warm climates people were small and lazy, less likely to 
engage in hard work. In addition they were "less white" 
than others and "more precocious," thus "love between the 
two sexes was a blind and impetuous desire, a function of 
the body, an appetite, a cry of nature." In the temperate 
climates love was a "passion of the soul, a considered 
affection ... systematic, a product of education," while in 
cold climates love was "the tranquil sentiment of little 
pressing need. "36 Each of these observations echoed, with 
little alteration, the opinions of Montesquieu. 
This brief glance at climate and its definition in the 
Encyclopedie demonstrates that Montesquieu's theory of 
climate was accepted as valid by the most important 
publishing venture of the Enlightenment. In addition it 
shows how the old definition of climate was gradually eased 
out of circulation and replaced by one that took into 
113 
consideration the various physical elements that constituted 
a "climate" and their role in the general relationship 
between physical and moral life. 
Conclusion 
Ideas about climate have exercised an important 
function in the history of Western thought, especially as a 
means of making more understandable the variety of people 
known to exist and their laws, institutions, moeurs. From 
the depths of antiquity to the Renaissance and Enlightenment 
the idea of climate proved itself flexible enough to adopt 
to some of the most pressing concerns of those who used it, 
whether Greek physicians, Renaissance historians, or 
Enlightenment political theorists and natural historians. 
Each employed climate and related ideas to account for the 
diversity that surrounded them and thus perpetuated the idea 
itself. 
With the Renaissance new avenues of learning were 
paved, avenues that led to a greater awareness of the 
importance of history and its influence on the development 
of societies. In order to grasp more completely the effect 
physical surroundings had on people's laws, institutions, 
and social customs, Bodin adopted prevalent ideas about 
climate, revamped and incorporated them into his effort to 
better understand how climate operated in nature and its 
role in human historical development. Combining a long held 
belief in the power of astrology, the tradition of climatic 
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zones, the particulars of an exact location and the array of 
factors that created them, Bodin was able to explain human 
variety, its existence, and its importance. By remolding 
prevalent ideas about climate and deftly synthesizing them 
into his historical analysis Bodin was able to answer these 
questions in a manner that reflected fully the concerns of 
Renaissance humanism with knowledge and education, the role 
of nature in human affairs, and lastly the importance of a 
reverent attitude toward the Creator by whose wisdom all 
things had their proper place. 
In eighteenth-century France theories of climate were 
once again revived and employed to explain the often 
bewildering reports of voyagers who sent back to Europe 
descriptions of the physical characteristics of many 
recently discovered peoples, their moeurs, laws, social and 
political institutions. A common thread woven throughout 
these reports was concern with variety and difference, both 
within these societies themselves and especially in relation 
to Europe. These differences had to be explained not only 
in order to make these societies understandable but to 
reaffirm the standards by which Europeans lived, for by 
their very existence they represented a challenge to Europe. 
In the works of Montesquieu and Buffon -- political 
theory and natural history respectively -- theories of 
climate were seized upon as a convenient means of 
explanation and categorization of people based on a 
combination of external physical elements that made these 
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societies comprehensible. Most important among these 
physical elements were the kinds of air (humid or dry), air 
temperature, geography, soil quality, latitude, and wind. 
Although their tasks were in some ways quite different, many 
similarities may be found in their works. Both Montesquieu 
and Buf fon discerned in the world a pattern of physical 
relationships that explained diversity because it was 
universally applicable. By resorting to the ancient idea of 
climate and adapting it to their investigative methods in 
novel ways both were able to create viable explanations for 
heterogenous peoples by an appeal to all-encompassing 
physical factors that affected, in varying degrees, all 
peoples. 
As noted above ideas about climate were not the 
exclusive domain of individual theorists, although they 
usually received their most cogent expression in their 
works. Implicitly in the Academy of Sciences and explicitly 
in the Encyclopedie climate received the attention, on the 
one hand, of scientists and, on the other, of those charged 
with providing the literate public with knowledge useful to 
increased understanding. In the 
Academy of Sciences the categories that constituted 
"climate" for Montesquieu and Buffon were recognized and 
investigated yet no explicit association tied "climate" to 
weather. To the contrary, in the Encyclopedie explicit 
reference was made to Montesquieu and his climate theory. 
116 
His theory was upheld with little or no opposition. In full 
agreement with Montesquieu the article "Climat" stated that 
the study of climate would allow for better understanding of 
the laws, moeurs, and social institutions of all peoples 
provided that one did not ascribe to climate complete 
domination. It was just one factor among many that needed 
thoughtful consideration. 
Climate in the Nineteenth Century 
Late in the eighteenth and early in the ninteenth 
century the human sciences began to take definite form and 
in doing so lent a new urgency to the study of human beings, 
their differences and similarities. 37 The eighteenth-
century debates between monogenist and polygenist theorists 
were settled in favor of polygenist adherents at the turn of 
the century. Henceforth polygenist arguments dominated the 
theoretical pronouncements and the study of people. The 
effect this had on climate theory was to diminish its 
importance; the people who supported arguments for multiple 
racial origins did not accept theories of climate as 
important because 
it was not pertinent to their theoretical position. 
The importance of the "Ideologues" in these 
circumstances was quite important. Intellectual descendants 
of the abbe de Condillac, the Ideologues believed fervently 
in the "science of ideas" and they proposed to found their 
science on an integrated examination of the "physical, 
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intellectual, and moral" aspects of human existence. 38 Yet 
the Ideologues were not completely united in their program 
and were split into two branches represented by P.-J.-G. 
Cabanis and Destutt de Tracy. De Tracy upheld the 
universalist tradition of the Ideologues by maintaining that 
human nature was everywhere the same, the ability to 
receive, respond, and combine sense impression was 
universal, despite particulars of the physical environment. 
Cabanis, however, was more sympathetic to polygenist 
arguments (though he remained a mongertist) that human beings 
had been shaped by variety of circumstances that imprinted 
physical traits that were difficult, if not impossible, to 
eradicate. 39 In the end Cabanis's analysis of physical 
types won out over the universalist implications of de Tracy 
and in this environment was born the virulent doctrine of 
race that dominated anthropology and ethnology in 
nineteenth-century France. 40 Thus in nineteenth-century 
France a backlash developed against those who attributed 
differences between the "races" to climate and in its place 
emerged racial interpretations that weakened climatic 
arguments because of their implications of a unifying 
heredity linking together all the "races" of man. 
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